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Cory Juhl's paper on fine-tuning is really interesting. He admirably covers a good amount of ground in the space of an Analysis paper.

I don't think ID and such has any scientific OR theological value, but I'm quite sympathetic to the fine-tuning argument, and find the fact that it seems to force atheists to postulate multiverses quite interesting. Could a response paper be written to the title "Fine-Tuning is Not Causal Ramification"? I'm inclined to think it could. Are the fundamental physical constants just an index of the causal ramification we in fact find? Quite possibly. Does that imply that the "probability space" in which such constants reside is "made up of thin air"? I think not. Is the fact that anything exists not prima facie surprising in itself? I think it still is, and if "fine-tuning" only vividly reminds us of this fact, it is still surprising.

I'm rambling. Please discuss.

I found the notion of theophobia particularly interesting since I also introduced that notion in a paper on which I am working since february. I also introduced the notion of ontophobia in general. To whom it may concern; here is a little excerpt from my paper (working draft):

...Physicalism, without a question, is the major position in recent philosophy of mind and ontology. Is this so because the better philosophical arguments are in favor of physicalism, establishing beyond any doubt its truth? Surely not. The main reasons, I suspect, are what I would like to call Ontophobia and Theophobia on side of those people that call themselves physicalists.
Ontophobia for one, as I use this term, is an intellectual illness whose main characteristic is an irrational angst that the universe might, after all, be ontologically more complex and, in a sense, ontologically richer than the simplistic ontology of physicalism allows for. That is, those people suffering from Ontophobia are afraid of the thought that the true story to be told about the universe might turn out to be not as simple as the ontological thesis that everything is physical or its epistemological pendant that everything is physically explainable.
Theophobia, as the name suggests, is another psychological deficit. Those suffering from Theophobia are afraid of the thought that there might be a God and they would, as sometimes they really do, go every route, even for the price of intellectual small-mindedness, to develop a philosophical system, however absurd, in order to avoid the conclusion or premise that God exists.
Now, it would be interesting, from a psychological point of view, to analyze in depth the genesis and spread of Theophobia and Ontophobia, but unfortunately I do not have the room to do that here. Instead I will try to cure the physicalist with a few thorough arguments against his position…

Matthew, Michael Murray's paper is indeed fascinating, thanks for posting it. One thing that he doesn't discuss is the reasons why religious people often contribute to a climate in which questions of truth are excluded from academic discussion of religion.

Consider his quotation from Bernard Rosen:

"But faith is, by
definition, a belief in that for which there is no proof: once a belief can be supported
by independent, scientific evidence, it loses its religious nature . . . . .when
considering any theory, the evidence has to carry the day, not the fact that it is
Christian."

I frequently encounter this view from students, and I find it incredibly frustrating. Of course, the fideism of Pascal or Kierkegaard is an important contribution to modern thought, but the quotation presupposes first that this modern view of Christian faith (where faith is contrasted with reason as a means of knowledge, rather than with works as a means of salvation) is definitive of what faith has always meant to Christians, and, furthermore, that having defined what faith means to Christians one has defined the fundamental mindset of all religions. The many traditions of intellectual justification within religions are not examined on their merits, they are simply overlooked because they are, by definition, not religious.

When students advance this kind of view, one can at least forgive them their historical ignorance and try to enlighten them, opening their minds to alternatives to fideism. What I find interesting is that this view of faith is particularly attractive to many religious students.

I think there are a number of reasons. First, there may be an intellectual laziness, or perhaps a lack of confidence. I've noticed many cliches whose presence in a student paper is often an excuse for an absence of thought. 'My personal experience/my faith/my personal opinion...' All of these are sources where the student has more expertise than the professor. If the student tells me what their personal opinion is, or what their faith is, the professor can hardly say that this is not their personal opinion or their personal faith. Of course, if they are talking about the faith of an established institution, they can be in error, but students generally assume that they know what their religion teaches. Another tactic, especially in papers on ethics, is to explain that we know what is right or wrong because 'Society' or 'the Church' or 'Religion' tells us, followed by a summary of the teaching of this approved authority. This is not generally indicative of a well thought out belief in moral relativism, but a lack of will or ability to use any tools of moral argument.

In fairness to my students, many of them are fresh from high-school. They frequently have not been taught how to defend a moral position by argument, and it is my job to teach them that it can be done. But I think that there are other reasons why fideism is attractive, even to students who know perfectly well how to engage in reasoned debate.

Engaging in reasoned debate about religious questions, subjecting one's self to standards of evidence, yields the possibility that one will discover that cherished beliefs are false. This can be very traumatic - when I was an undergraduate, a good friend of mine who was one of the leaders of the Christian Union, and an excellent student of Theology, lost his faith as a result of his studies. I know that is was a painful experience for him. Dr. Johnson was famously reticent about subjecting his religious views to debate, telling Boswell that even a man who is innocent of murder, and is confident of his own innocence, would not like to be placed on trial for murder. I remember for myself the first time that I learned of the possibility that historical study could undermine the credibility of the Gospels: my doubts manifested themselves tangibly in my stomache, there was a sensation of panic. Incidentally, it has been many years since anything I read has made me feel that same sensation. Does that mean my faith is getting weaker or stronger?

Now, I've no doubt that there are professors who see it as their duty to undermine students' religious faith, and guide them to atheism. However, there are also I'm sure many professors who, like me, have no wish to push our students to the brink of a nervous breakdown. I imagine a student coming to my office, explaining that thanks to my teaching, he is breaking away from his religion, alienating his family, and has not yet found any other system of belief to hang on to, he is depressed...It is not an attractive thought. I might add that I think that, as philosophers, we should be prepared to face these consequences of our teaching. The quest for truth is not to be undertaken lightly. Still, it is tempting to take the easy way out (particularly, perhaps, if I think of myself as teaching Religious Studies rather than Philosophy: it happens that I teach in both subject areas).

The easy way out, for professors and students, is to praise Faith as such, that wonderful attitude that gives meaning to life. Your faith may not be the same as mine, but cherish it, whatever it is, and be true to whatever makes you feel comfortable. Don't be disturbed by the study of religion - remember, this is mere academic study and has nothing to do with faith.

I don't accept the ideology behind the easy way out, but I find it tempting - indeed, I am trying to expose it as a temptation rather than a truth. Better to reassure than to disturb.

This is partly a matter of my personality - I'm tempermentally unsuited to playing the part of iconoclast. However, there are also forces of academic politics at work. We are expected, rightly, to respect students' identities and communities, and to refrain from insulting their cultures. A belief is, I would say, something that is true or false, and in the classroom, it is usual to examine beliefs and determine which they are. However, one reason we are so attached to certain beliefs is because of the communities that we belong to - a change in those beliefs would have a significant effect, perhaps a negative effect, on important personal relationships. Telling someone that you think their religious beliefs are false can easily be interpreted as an insult. One way round this is to be careful to present such statements in a sensitive manner, but again, the temptation is not to say such things at all, leaving the issue of truth and falsity for outside the classroom, engaging in the pretence that when one studies the history of religions, one only studies what religious people believe, and can avoid in every case the question of whether what they believe is true or false.

If teachers of subjects such as Religious Studies repeatedly duck out of such questions in their classes, it is no wonder that scientists will dismiss theological questions as incapable of rational resolution.

The heap of duties that attend the end of the semester mean I can offer just a couple of comments.

Micah-
I don't have time to discuss the matter myself, but if you haven't been to Robin Collins' site you might visit for some good reading.

BP Göcke-
Sounds like a promising project. I think theophobia is something that we are all familiar with, but it is nice to see people addressing its causes and claims.

B Murphy-
I think anyone who has taught undergrads has had a similar experience. Contemporary fideism isn't a position reached on reflection, but a retreat for the intellectually lazy. Two contributors are latent anti-intellectualism and post-modernism, which may sound redundant. I think it's ok to press these individuals to give an answer, but if they flounder you might show them what they should have said instead. (e.g. I think what you want to say is X.) Those of us familiar with the issues can provide this service for theist and atheist alike. I don't really see the point of simply disabusing people of their previously held beliefs if we aren't careful what fills the void.

Ben,
Those were good thoughts. I recommend taking a look (unless you have already) at Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief on his definition of faith and its relationship to knowledge. He also has a nice section in the book on the role of defeaters to Christian belief as well.

I'm not sure if this is contrary to what you are saying, but I think that many students can indeed, know, have justified belief, have rational belief that Christianity is true 'based' on personal religious experience. (I use the word 'based' lightly, not in an epistemological sense.) I think this is true just as I think an intro student can know that other minds exist or the external world exists based or that induction holds, and all this without philosophical argument.

However, this doesn't absolve them of not fulfilling their writing assignment or not engaging in careful reflection just as it wouldn't absolve them to just say "Nope, I just know the external world exists" or "Nope, Hume's just wrong about induction" and let that be their whole paper. Careful articulation and presentation of argument, of course, is necessary for philosophy. And yeah, I agree that intellectual laziness can be the cause of their bad papers.