Are Guilt and Shame Good?

Dear Mike,

All of your comments seem very plausible to me. I think we need some general account of guilt and shame in order to tell whether guilt and shame are intrinsically bad though. So, I'm a little doubtful about (a) above. Suppose guilt is just an emotion with some phenomenolgical property p. I say experiencing p feels bad and that is one reason to think guilt is intrinsically bad. Suppose that guilt is also its "seeming to oneself to have done something wrong". Suppose that this seeming is a truth-tracking state, then depedning upon how we characterize "seeming" it is plausible that in ivrtue of guilt being partly analyzable in terms of it, guilt will have a feature that is intrinsically good as well as a feature that is intrinsically bad.

"Suppose that guilt is also its "seeming to oneself to have done something wrong". Suppose that this seeming is a truth-tracking state, then depedning upon how we characterize "seeming" it is plausible that in ivrtue of guilt being partly analyzable in terms of it, guilt will have a feature that is intrinsically good as well as a feature that is intrinsically bad."

It is probably right that guilt has a cognitive component: i.e., it does involve the belief that you've done something wrong. I'm less certain that the belief "tracks truth", since it is commonplace that people feel guilt inappropriately, for things they did not do or could not have altered. But even supposing that the belief was evidential, that would still make guilt instrumentally good: good insofar as led to true beliefs about one's moral state.

I'm having a hard time accepting premise 1 of the argument for reasons similar to Mike's comment above. Insofar as people do things that they should feel guilty about, then yes, it seems better that they feel appropriately guilty. But a world where people don't feel guilty because they don't perform such actions would be better, would it not?

As an analogy, one might consider an action that is clearly good, like showing charity to the poor. While there can be no doubt that in any world in which there is poverty such charity is a good thing, a world with no poverty would be better.

Just wanted to say I'm at the SCP at ND and won't be able to say much on this for a few days, but I'm honored that Mike found the idea worth pursuing even if only to ultimately reject it.

I just wanted to point out that I did reply on my blog that I was holding fixed the actual individuals in *this very* world. So maybe there are all kinds of mysteries involved in why God makes the kind of world he makes, but I think that IF he has reason to make a world much like this one with people like us (and apparently He did) then he's got reason not to create versions of us without conscience.

So my affirmation of shame was modulo a lot of what we know is actual. The fundamental idea is that the world that's just like this one except I have *even less* shame (I have been accused of lacking it) would *clearly* be a much, much worse one.

[You may rest assured that world in which I lack shame due to virtue are very distant worlds indeed!]

Mike, please don't quote me. It's embarassing how often I misspell words. Haha.

You may be right that if seeming states are good because they are truth-tracking, then they are instrumentally good for that reason. It is not obvious though, because the "seeming to be true" is a feature of a mental state, perhaps a higher order state, and perhaps it is good either because

(i) Seeming to be true is intrinsically good, or
(ii) Seeming to be true is extrinsically good, but extrnisic in that it relates a seeming state to a belief (so for all purposes, intrinsic).

Perhaps independent of how many of one's beliefs are, or would be true, being in a seeming state is good. For example, in a Matrix world most of our beliefs are arguably false. But they are justified. So, the seeming states which justify the beliefs are intrinsically good, because justification is, and seeming states are justifiers independent of the way the world is. That last point should cast doubt on the idea that seeming states are instrumentally good, being instrumentally good seems to be a property that depends upon the way the world is.

Modestly, if instrumental goods don't depend on the way the world is, then the line between instrumental and non-instrumental good may not be as clear as one might initially think and so using the distinction in an argument might require defense.

I don't understand Trent's response. In what way does holding fixed actual individuals effect the argument? Isn't the idea that God could have created a world like this without shame and guilt and whether this world is better than one with shame and guilt will depend upon whether shame and guilt are essential good making features of a world by being intrinsically good or instrumentally good?

Trent,

I don't think I'm rejecting your conclusion. I have some questions and worries (but I have those about every view!). So I'm mostly asking questions about it.

Michael,

Your question goes to whether the closest world to ours in which there is no guilt/shame is one in which (i) there is wrongdoing but no guilt/shame or (ii) there is neither wrongdoing nor guilt/shame.
I think the suggestion is that the closest worlds are those in which (i) holds. This is not to deny that there are some worlds in which (ii) holds.
But, I think there's a more basic question. Is it better that anyone feels guilt in cases where most would regard it as appropriate? Suppose S is morally reponsible for X and X is wrong. Even in these cases it is not clear to me that it is good that S feels guilt at having done X. There are less punishing ways, it seems, to have S avoid doing X in the future.

You all are talking about guilt and shame as if they are the worst things in the world. I feel them all the time.. it's not that bad. How else would someone change from someone who does bad to someone who does good?

". . . in a Matrix world most of our beliefs are arguably false. But they are justified. So, the seeming states which justify the beliefs are intrinsically good." (sorry, another quote)

I don't follow you. Suppose the state of it seeming to me that I am seeing a tree there justifies my belief that there is a tree there. Why is the state therefore valuable? I suppose itmight have some epistemic value, but I think we talking about the moral value of a world. So the world is not morally better because it includes perceptual states that justify beliefs. Not as far as I can tell, anyway.

But you write elsewhere,

"I don't understand Trent's response. In what way does holding fixed actual individuals effect the argument? Isn't the idea that God could have created a world like this without shame and guilt and whether this world is better than one with shame and guilt will depend upon whether shame and guilt are essential good making features of a world by being intrinsically good or instrumentally good?"

I don't think that is *the* idea. But I think it is related to one idea that was raised. Trent's restiction is designed to limit the set of worlds relevant for moral comparison. So we cannot compare the actual world to worlds that are radically different from it in determining the value of guilt/shame. For instance you cannot compare the actual world with worlds that contain human beings that always do what is right and never need to feel guilt/shame. Something like this, I think.

Mike, you likely know what I'm going to say. I think the world is better, in terms of value, in virtue of containing justified mental states. I think justification is intrinsically good, the goal of attaining truth a worthy one and justification helps to explain this (notice I didn't say justification is only good insofar as it contributes to true beliefs). I don't see the distinction in value you seem inclined to, that epistemic value is not moral value, for example. A value is a value.

On behalf of Trent you suggest "you cannot compare the actual world with worlds that contain human beings that always do what is right and never need to feel guilt/shame."

Well, if that is what he has in mind, the view seems false to me. Either it assumes a restriction on "what it takes to compare" that is too demanding, or...I don't know. I can't think of any good reason to think its true, it just seems false. Just consider simple two person worlds. They are qualitively identical, but in one there are feelings of shame/guilt that partly cause good behavior, in the other, all is the same, but instead of shame/guilt, partly causing good behavior, a feeling of ugliness causes it, an attitude reportable by "Yuk that!" But it doesn't feel as bad to be in a "Yuk that" state, but it is equally causally efficacious.

I say I just made the comparison and my Yuk that world is better.

"I don't see the distinction in value you seem inclined to, that epistemic value is not moral value, for example. A value is a value".

Christian,
This is a very unusual view of value. Certainly when I make an aesthetic evaluation of Smith's new Ford, I am not claiming that his Ford is immoral or that it lacks moral value. To say it lacks moral value is not even coherent, I think. Rather I am saying that it lacks aesthetic value. Similarly for epistemic value: when I say you are unjustified in your belief that p, I am not making anything like a moral appraisal of you. I am rather making an epistemic appraisal. Still further, when I say that your choice of stocks was not good, I am making a claim about the prudential value of that stock: i.e., that owning it is not in your self-interest. But I am certainly not saying that you did anything morally wrong in choosing the stock: indeed, it might be the morally best thing you could have done.

Mike, actions and maybe people are immoral, not Fords. But I take it you think moral values are a sub-class of values, aesthetic and prudential values not moral values at all. I deny this. It isn't clear to me either that this view is unusual.

Take the fitting view of intrinsic goodness: x is intrinsically good for S iff x itself gives S a reason to to favor x.

This is defended by Brentano, Broad, Brandt, Ewing, McDowell, Chisholm, Wiggins, Gibbard, Anderson, Lemos, and Scanlon. Chris Heathwood discussed this view today in Boulder and the references are his.

Anyway, I take it aesthetic, prudential and epistemic reasons will count as intrinsic goods and I think this is very strong evidence in favor of the view that each are moral values. Additionally, we say things like beauty makes the world better and if that isn't a moral reason, then I don't know what is.

"Mike, actions and maybe people are immoral, not Fords"
I never denied this. In fact, I'm certain this was my very point and that I clearly implied it above in my counterexample.
"But I take it you think moral values are a sub-class of values, aesthetic and prudential values not moral values at all".
These are various sorts of values, yes.
"Take the fitting view of intrinsic goodness: x is intrinsically good for S iff x itself gives S a reason to to favor x."
This view is perfectly compatible with every claim I made (not that I endorse the view or find it particularly illuminating). I never denied that there were intrinsic aesthethic values or intrinsic prudential values, for instance.
"... I take it aesthetic, prudential and epistemic reasons will count as intrinsic goods and I think this is very strong evidence in favor of the view that each are moral values"
In fact, this is no evidence at all for such a conclusion. That a value is intrinsic is not evidence that it is a moral value, an aesthetic value, a prudential value, or any other particular value. Why on earth would it be? You could as reasonably conclude that all values are aesthetic values. That is an equally unwarranted conclusion.
"Additionally, we say things like beauty makes the world better and if that isn't a moral reason, then I don't know what is".
An aesthetically pleasing world might make the world morally better. But, if so, it does so instumentally. On the other hand, I deny that if S produces a painting that is less aesthetically appealing than another he could have produced, then some moral criticism is appropriate. That is just blindingly obvious. But I'm happy to acknowledge that you disagree with this and move on.

So you're happy to say there is an x such that x is intrinsically good and x is not a moral value. I take it that if x is intrinsically good then x is a moral value. I suggest this is true because intrinsic goods make the world better (all else equal), intsrumentally or otherwsie, and making the world better is sufficient for something to be a moral value. I also suggest that if x is good, intrinsically or otherwise, then x is a moral value. You "seem" to deny this. You seem to think that (i) x can make the world better, (ii) it can be intrinsically good, (iii) it can perhaps provide a reason for action, and (iv) x can be a value, but you you still think that some x can meet those conditions and not be a "moral" value because it is a non-moral value. Is that right?

If so, then I don't know what you mean by the expression "moral value". I don't.

"I also suggest that if x is good, intrinsically or otherwise, then x is a moral value. You "seem" to deny this"

Of course, I deny it, unless you are using 'moral' in some idiosyncratic way. I deny that all value collapses into moral value. For instance, I deny that the following is a moral judgment:

J. The painting is a valuable work of art.

You seem to think that (J) is a moral judgment, a judgment about the moral value of the art presumably. Certainly on the face of it, (J) is not a moral judgment; and I haven't seen any argument so far that would convince me that it is one.

You give me examples of values you suggest are not moral values, then I deny them. All your examples satisfy the principles I take to be sufficient for something to be a moral value. You think my use of "moral" in moral value is idiosyncratic and you might be right, I'm not sure. But all you have are examples, not a principled way to tell me why my use isn't correct.

I agree that it would be odd to say:

J* The painting is a morally valuable work of art.

But it is also somewhat odd to say:

K WWII saw some of the most morally disvaluable acts of man.

So, the oddness of the judgment I don't find telling. Suppose you give me an account of aesthetic value, where, it turns out that J is true iff the painting is disposed to give rise to a certain kind of pleasure in viewers, for example. I think that is a morally relevant property, a disposition to give pleasure, if anything is. Calling the pleasure aesthetic pleasure makes it no less a moral property, I think.

A similar debate arises for people who think there is a prudential "should" and others who think consequentialism is true.

Anyway, I don't see what hangs on this distinction anymore. You're a comptent language user and if it sounds bad to say beauty is moral value, I trust your ear. Initially I suggested that cognitive states like seemings are valuable so that perhas guilt is valuable by virtue of containing them. This was intended to cast doubt on (a) in the post.

I take it you think that justification and knowledge only have moral value, if ever, when they contribute to the existence of moral value so that guilt could at best be extrinsically or instrumentally valuable. I think my response is to say "fine" but there is this "schvalue" and guilt may have it, it's had intrinsically and makes a world that contains it better and will play the role of value in making cross-world comparisons.

". . .but there is this "schvalue" and guilt may have it, it's had intrinsically and makes a world that contains it better and will play the role of value in making cross-world comparisons"

I suppose it can play a role in cross world comparisons. But I don't see how this is relevant. We can also compare worlds by the number of indigenous pigeons. But that doesn't make one world better than another in the relevant sense (pace, all the bird lovers).
The introduction of schmalue won't play the moral role you want it to play unless you can show that all value reduces to moral value. I haven't seen such an argument yet.
But I guess you should ask Trent--if you really want to pursue this line further--though I'm pretty sure his argument concerns the relative moral value of worlds.

But...your premise is stated:

Premise (1) If the history of the world had included no experiences of guilt and shame, the world would be on balance (much?) worse than it is.

If you say that my "schmoral schvalue", what I think is plain old value, can't play the role in moral comparison, then you must mean by "on balance worse" a somthing like "morally worse" in your sense of "moral".

I think you can stipulate this for sure, but then Trent or however want to put forward the argument above can simply deny you've presented any counterexamples since they are interested in genuine world comparisons, not comparisons in your technical sense.

I take it that a being of which no greater being can be conceived couldn't be correctly criticised for making bad prudential choices or being a scribbler. If this world had no beauty in it, I say that would be another version of the argument from evil and also persuasive, but then again, I could just as well call it the argument from scmevil.

In the end though, even though I disagree with you on what values are, I still agree that the argument above is bad. I think your points (b) and (c) to be very strong.

"If you say that my "schmoral schvalue", what I think is plain old value, can't play the role in moral comparison, then you must mean by "on balance worse" a somthing like "morally worse" in your sense of "moral""

That's right. And I am using it that way because (as far as I can tell) that's how Trent is ranking worlds--according to their moral value. There is nothing technical in my usage.
Maybe in addition to the attribute of essential moral perfection God also possesses attribute of essential aesthetic perfection. If so then the world would have to be such that God could not have actualized a more beautiful one. But that is not the argument from evil. It is the argument from ugly (if I may). That's an interesting idea, since both moral and nonmoral value contribute to individual well-being (I mean, arguably this is so) and a perfect being might have to actualize a world that maximizes well-being and not just moral value. Such a world would include lots of values other than moral ones.

I like that, "the argument from ugly". I almost spit out my coffee.

And that reminds me of another point. Some theistically minded people are inclined to move from God's perfection to her omniscience. But on your view, being omniscient is not morally valuable, right? I mean "justification is not a moral value, a belief isn't on your view. Is non-accidental truth a moral value? So, you would reject this move.

Isn't this a bit telling?

Christian,

I don't know of anyone who moves from moral perfection to omniscience. I do know that a perfect being traditionally has attributed to him *all* of the perfections including moral perfection, epistemic perfection, necessary existence, perfect power and so on. So being perfect simpliciter, entails possessing all of the relevant perfections, but being morally perfect does not entail any of the other perfections: in particular it does not entail being essentially omniscient.

I thought that's what you would say. But "I" didn't say people move from "moral perfection" to omniscience, just perfection to omniscience, or rather, being the best possible being to being omniscient. So you deny that

(a) S is a being of which no greater can be conceived, that is, S is the greatest possible being

entails

(b) S is essentially omniscient.

And in addition to there being different kinds of values, you think there are different kinds of perfections, rather than plain perfection and those properties which contribute to it.

Question: Is there any (non-trivial) property p, on your view, which will licence the move from S has p, to S is omniscient?

Let me skip ahead. Yes, a world in which there is more knowledge is one that is better epistemically. But epistemically good worlds need not be morally good worlds. This should be familiar. What then about a perfect world simpliciter, I guess you're going to ask. I don't think there is such a world, for Leibnizian reasons. What then about a best possible world, you'll ask next. A best possible world, unlike a best possible being, might not be an epistemically good world.
This is getting like work. I'm going to have to start the meter soon.

"A best possible world, unlike a best possible being, might not be an epistemically good world."

That's a little curious. I can't off the cuff think of any good reason to think that's true. A world is "a being" in every way that seems to count. If you think the best possible being could create or co-exist with an epistemically sub-par world, then why accept that the best possible being could not also be epistemically sub-par?

I don't see how the usually best possible being-making property trade-off isn't mimiced in the best possible world trade-off in exactly analogous ways.

Consider two ways to argue that God has some feature F.

If x is the best possible being, then x is essentially omniscient, loving...God is the best possible being, so...

If x is perfectly loving, knowing, essentially...then x is the best possible being.

I prefer the first way. You seem to go for the second, suggesting we have an independent grasp on what properties are perfect making, then arguing God has the best mix of them. I think we have no independent grasp, but infer that god has certain properties because we have an independent grasp on perfection.

If the first way were good, then why shouldn't we think god is a perfect free-throw shooter, a perfect summersalter, a...

Why? These are properties and we can modify them with 'perfect' suggesting they are best possible being making properties. But they aren't. And we know they aren't and this is because, I think, we have an independent grasp on what a best possible being is.

And this seems to exclude making a world with epistemic deficiencies or one that is totally ugly.