Theological Determinism and Supererogatory Salvation

If by damnation you mean eternal suffering or something along those lines, then reconciling 1, 2 and 3 is difficult. An alternative is to take some sort of annihilationist view towards damnation. Then you have a situation in which God does not permit any new evil by not saving those who don't deserve it (they just blink out of existence, as it were).

Combine this with a view about salvation where the good that comes out of saving one person is infinite in the sense that multiple instances do not increase the amount of good generated, and then as long as one person receives salvation, God's omnibenevolence is preserved.

I think Augustine took an interesting line, suggesting eternal misery in hell is a good thing given that those who deserve it are going there.

Kevin, what is Theological Determinism, the view that we have no control over which future is actual because God foreknowledge of which future is actual?

Anyway, I'm inclined to deny 4 because I think everybody is owed salvation, just like starving children are owed food.

I'm inclined to deny 3 because I think If God did exist, then his allowing would be causation by omission.

I would deny 2 because that would be about as strong a counterexample to God's goodness as I can imagine. If 2 is true, then we are all elves.

But, 1 seems plausible enough if you just mean God would have foreknowledge of a certain sort.

Mike,


Yes, I was thinking of damnation along the lines of eternal suffering of some sort or other. But even if damnation just involves a temporal period of suffering prior to the annihilation, I think that the same worry is there.


Christian,


Yes, Auquinas shares Augustine's line of thought that you mention. This line of thought is developed and defended in what may be my single favorite philosophy of religion article: Stump's "Dante’s Hell, Aquinas’s Moral Theory,
and the Love of God.��? (But note that this line of thought is in tension with your rejection of 2)


By 'theological determinism' I didn't simply mean that God has foreknowledge of every event, including actions. Instead, I meant something stronger: the thesis that God determines all events (including actions and volitions) through His will. To quote Kirwan defines: “every event and state of the world either is God’s act or is brought about by God’s act��? (Augustine (London: Routledge, 1989), 117)

Kevin,

You're right. Any sort of suffering involved in damnation is going to raise problems. The solution I had in mind was instant annihilation, with no suffering involved, which is one way to remove any sort of logical inconsistency between 1-4. But most people probably wouldn't like that solution, since it does offend orthodox sensibilities (assuming we're working within a generally Christian framework).

Mike -- It seems as though even instant annihilation would be problematic. It seems as though getting rid of "suffering" within the framework just skirts the issue, since "suffering" does exist (in light of Kevin's elaboration on 1). The fun should be in exploring the interplay of the options, not short-circuiting them.

Kevin, depending one what you mean by "brings about" your definition of determinism could be pretty weak.

My wife can bring it about that I eat a cookie just by making cookies and not hiding them from me.

In fact, apart from some intra-mural molinist issues--whether counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are brought about by an act of God--it's hard to think of many people that can't accept that kind of determinism. But that would seem odd since I think most people don't want to call themselves determinists.

Augustine says a little more than just that hell is what people deserve (which I think is pretty much already entailed by what Paul says, but I don't think he says it so explicitly). Augustine spends a bit of time motivating the idea that hell is just people continuing to be what they already are character-wise. The reason they deserve it is because they're really making their bed and then having to sleep in it because they're making hell exactly what it is. It's not original to Augustine, either. Plato says something similar in the Theaetetus, just without the full-blown eternal hell idea. Injustice is its own punishment, because the unjust have to be unjust, and that's the worst way you can be. I can say that several contemporary Calvinist theologians take exactly this line.

For what it's worth, I doubt the annihilation view is tenable for the same reasons that the eternal suffering view is tenable. I say 'tenable' because dispassionate reasoning is important to philosophical exchange, but I actually would say the idea is downright morally abominable, that God would either annihilate souls or allow them to freely remain in hell. If this is what Calvinist say, that strikes me as a very sad, sad thing.

Imagine thinking of one's children this way.

I also share Trent's worries concerning determinism. How can we spell it out so that it is consistent with (3). How can God's refraining not be a cause?

With regard to (A), I see no reason why there would be a 'tension' between 3 & 4 and divine goodness; if everyone deserves damnation and salvation is supererogatory, then it seems to follow that if God lets anyone be damned, He is being just, and if he saves anyone at all he is being more merciful than justice requires -- and being both just (as, for example, good to the fulfillment of all obligation) and merciful (as good beyond what obligation requires) sounds like the whole point of saying that God is 'omnibenevolent'. A problem only arises, as far as I can see, if some of the damned don't deserve it or if (as Christian suggested) salvation is not supererogatory. Likewise, I don't see why suffering would be a problem unless it is gratuitous. If anyone genuinely deserves to suffer then it follows that interfering with their suffering is either injustice or, if you have the authority to pardon, supererogatory mercy. Of course, we do tend to think of suffering as gratuitous; but surely anyone who is willing to accept (1)-(4) wouldn't hesitate to suggest that people are simply not thinking the matter through. (But this is assuming that (4) implies that 'the damned don't deserve their fate' is false.)

On B, I'm inclined to say there's no problem here, either. After all, if (4) is false, then God does owe some individuals salvation, for whatever reason. And so if (1), (2), and (3) are true, and not-(4) is true, God is being perfectly just; all (4) adds is supererogatory goodness (on this particular point). Depending on how people conceive omnibenevolence, there might be a case that this is not enough; but there's at least a plausible case for consistency, enough to make it reasonable for the advocate of S-minus-(4) to expect his opponents to take the burden of proof. After all, the denial of (4) doesn't imply that God owes even those he damns salvation, only that He owes it to at least some individuals (whom He saves, on supposition of divine benevolence).

Much as I dislike S, I don't think it seriously suffers from any problems due to inconsistency with divine goodness.

Why does it matter whether you call it a cause? Determinists in the standard sense are generally happy to say that are actions are caused by things that, if you trace the causes back far enough, are outside our power. That never stops compatibilists from saying that we are fully free and morally responsible. So compatibilists will accept 1, 2, and 4, and I think those of you resisting Kevin's arrangement above would equally resist this.

I don't think Calvin, Leibniz, or Edwards would accept a full compatibilist picture any more than Augustine or Aquinas would, but it doesn't seem to me that you need to say that God doesn't cause free choices to sin or not to repent (or whatever leads to a destination of hell) in order to raise the prima facie problem. I do think Kevin intended to include more than efficient causal determinism, because he seems to want to include people like Augustine and Aquinas, both of whom at least think they're offering views that deny what the Stoics say about being caused by efficient causes. They think our free will is caused by final causes, but they both insist that our actions are caused, because every event is causes in some sense, and they both insist that God's plan includes what everyone will freely choose to do, even choices that affect final destinations. So I don't think you need the Stoic efficient causal determinism to get 1-4 as intended by Kevin. My understanding of Calvin, Edwards, Leibniz, and other actual philosophers who are generally classified as Calvinists is that they hold a similar view, even if some of the theologians without as much philosophical training in these distinctions might adopt something more like Stoicism (or the modern equivalent).

Kevin, one of your questions is the following,

"Is S consistent with divine omnibenevolence? In other words, is there a tension between 3, 4, and God's gooness?"

There is indeed a tension here. If God is essentially perfectly good (I take that to be what you mean by 'omnibenevolent') then there is no *possible being* that is better (He is, in short, unsurpassably good). Let P and P' each fulfill every obligation and let them differ only in this respect: P' performs every superogatory action. On most accounts of moral goodness, P' is a better being than P. And this is exactly what we say about human beings that live lives of exemplary moral purpose: individuals who regularly pursue the supererogatory course of action. They are in fact living up to higher standards and are more worthy.
Since P' is more worthy than P, P is not an essentially perfectly good being. Omnibenevolence requires not just fulfilling your obligations, but performing the best possible actions. This is the line taken by Bill Rowe in several places (lately in 'Can God be Free?' OUP 2004) and it looks to me exactly right.

I suspect some incoherence in the description of the problem (as well). On the one hand we can assume that the damned "deserve their damnation" in virtue of doing some evil(s) E. But given theological determinism (as Kevin elaborates it above) the obvious plea is that God (not they) ultimately caused E. This fact makes claim (4) false.
4. God owes salvation to no individaul. That is, for every act of saving an individual by God causing them to come to saiving faith, that act is a supererogatory action.
But if God ultimately caused E (and that follows directly from theo. determinism) and *I* am the one suffering for what he caused, then He does owe me salvation, contrary to (4).

I don't think I get this. 1. can't entail the falsity of 4. God's having ultimately caused the E doesn’t mean God owes anyone salvation. You'd at least have to say what it is in virtue of which someone is owed it from God.

Kyle,

Think about the worst possible thing that could happen to someone. I think it is rather plausible that if I can keep that from happening, I owe it to the person.

There seems to be two concepts of 'owing' someone something. First, there is the owing that is generated by, perhaps, a special obligation I create in virtue of something I do, a promise for example. Second, there is the object of a general obligation kind of owing. For example, I think I owe starving children in distant countries my rersources because I have an obligation whose satisfaction requires that some individuals get my resources.

I think the sense in which God owes everybody salvation is of the second type, he is under an obligation to do the best he can. And on top of that, Mike's point about surpassibility seems to me a very strong one, that even if handing out salvation is not obligatory, then it is supereragatory and that the best possible being performs all supereragatory acts.

Kyle,

I thought it would be more or less obviuos how the argument would go, but it might be interesting if it is stated more fully.

1.I deserve eternal damnation only if I am (morally) responsible for bringing about some bad state of affairs, E.
2. God is responsible for bring about all events and state of affairs (Theo. Determinism).
3. There are no bad states of affairs E that I am responsible for bringing about. (from 2)
4. A morally perfect being would not impose a punishment on me that I do not deserve. (from concept of moral perfection)
5. I do not deserve eternal damnation. (3,1)
6. God (a morally perfect being) would not impose eternal damnation on me. (5,4)
7. If I'm not damned, I'm saved.
8. I'm saved. (6, 7)

So God's saving me is not supererogatory. Rather it would be wrong not to save me since I've done nothing to warrant eternal damnation. I guess the obvious response is to add to Kevin's (1)-(4) above some form of compatiblism. But I didn't think Kevin was making that assumption.

Looking back over Kevin's remarks, I guess I can't reconcile (1) (my numbering),

(1) "Despite 1 [i.e., theological determinism] God doesn't cause the damnation of any individual. Let to her own devices, each individual will become damned. Rather, He simply refrains from causing their salvation."

with (2) (again, my numbering),

(2) "By 'theological determinism'. . . I meant the thesis that God determines all events (including actions and volitions) through His will. To quote Kirwan defines: “every event and state of the world either is God’s act or is brought about by God’s act��?"

In my argument I have in mind the theological determnism in (2). I don't think that (2) is compatible with the theological determinism in (1). Or else, I don't see it.

Mike,

How does 3 follow from 2? I don't see how you can derive that premise without rejecting some form of compatibilism at the outset, which I think the defender of S will want to accept.

James,

That might be right. I just didn't see any place where Kevin was assuming compatiblism. But assuming compatiblism makes the whole discussion simpler.

I don't think we can say that omnibenevolence requires the performance of every supererogatory act (unless we are willing to say that the concept of omnibenevolence is incoherent). Rogation or duty is a (relatively) well-defined field of actions; since supererogation is anything going beyond duty (without violating duty), we can't assume that there are no mutually exclusive supererogatory acts. Indeed, since for any particular duty there might be several different things you could do that would be supererogatory, it seems plausible that some supererogatory actions are mutually exclusive. Further, we can't merely assume that performing every supererogatory act is itself a case of supererogatory goodness (for instance, it might be that a maximally compossible set of supererogatory actions is itself suberogatory, e.g., if that particular mix of supererogatory acts is, overall, unwise; or what have you). Likewise, we can't simply assume for a given domain that there are any genuinely supererogatory actions, since in some cases it is a duty to stick to duty alone. So we can't assume that the best possible being would perform all supererogatory acts; nor can we even assume that the best possible being would perform any on this particular point. We'd need arguments in both cases that the supererogations in question were the best possible actions.

"I don't think we can say that omnibenevolence requires the performance of every supererogatory act (unless we are willing to say that the concept of omnibenevolence is incoherent)"

But there is no genuine problem here. What omnibenevolence requires is the an essentially perfectly good being always do *the best possible action*. In general (though not always) doing what is best will require performing supererogatory actions.
Aside from this, even if the set of supererogatory actions were inconsistent, it would not follow that the concept of omnibenevolence is incoherent. A moral theory that generates a moral dilemma (i.e., the requirement to perform inconsistent actions) is not even close to incoherent. Several assumptions about deontic theorems are necessary to derive an outright inconsistency and most of those theorems are controversial. So I don't see a genuine worry either way.

Brandon,

My point is really a simple one. If God exists, he is unsurpassable. If he is unsurpassable, then he does all he is obligated to do and every supereragatory act he is able to do. If he satisfies his obligations and does every supereragatory act he is able to do, then he saves everybody and universalism is false. So, if God exists, then universalism is false.

So I do think that omnibenevolence requires performing every super act that one is able to perform, in cases of ties, then one of the tied acts. This doesn't require us to assume there are no ties.

I'm not sure why anybody would think there is such a thing as "a duty to stick to duty alone" or "supereragatory goodness".

And we don't need to think these cases of supererogation are the best possible actions, we only need to think that there are clearly better alternatives to sending (allowing) people to be in eternal hell.

Lastly, I doubt that supererogation is even relevant to the above discussion. It is a concept that primarily concerns self-sacrifice, going "over and above" what morality requires. Of course, it is entirely unclear how God could sacrice anything. How can God make himself "worse off"?

S does seem to be committed to a kind of compatibilism. This doesn't necessarily make things simpler, but it does reconcile your (1)(Kevin's 3.). This would be clearer if Kevin's 3. were instead "Despite 1., God isn't morally blameworthy for anyone's being damned." Maybe this was what was intended anyway. Then Kevin's questions about divine benvolence become more pointed: surely being omnibenevolent requires more than simply avoiding things for which one will be morally blameworthy.

"S does seem to be committed to a kind of compatibilism. This doesn't necessarily make things simpler, but it does reconcile your (1)(Kevin's 3.). . . Then Kevin's questions about divine benvolence become more pointed: surely being omnibenevolent requires more than simply avoiding things for which one will be morally blameworthy."

But that question is certainly simpler. If the agent is choosing and acting freely, then it is less obvious that an omnibenevolent being does something wrong choosing damnation for him for those choices and actions. If the person is not acting and choosing freely then it is more obvious that an omnibenevolent being does something wrong in choosing damnation for him.
It seems a simpler question in the former case since justifying damnation can appeal to free choice and action. It seems more complex in the latter case since justifying damnation cannot appeal to free choice and action. So oncde we have free choice and action stipulated, it is much easier to conclude that damnation is justified.

Trent,

As I tried to indicate earlier, I intend ‘theological determinism’ to be a strong notion: God’s willing X is necessary and sufficient for X to come about. Unless we assume some sort of CCF, I don’t see how your wife’s making cookies and not hiding them *determines* that you eat them.

Regarding compatibilism. Yes, if one is talking about people deserving punishment, that seems to presuppose that they are morally responsible. And if theological determinism is true, then I think this does commit one to compatibilism. Perhaps not if there is some way to deserve punishment even if one isn’t a moral agent, but I don’t see that either.

Mike and Christian,

I also think that two of you are right to put the issue in terms of unsurpassable goodness—this is, I think, quite helpful.

Mike,

In regard to how your #1 relates to your #2, I put your #1 the way I did because of a move that I make in my grace paper, and that is that omissions strictly speaking don’t cause things, only quasi-cause them. So even if God’s failing to will my salvation doesn’t make Him, strictly speaking, the cause of my damnation, His failing to will my salvation ensures that I am damned.

Brandon,

Even if you’re correct that there are some cases where performing a supererogatory act A precludes one from performing a supererogatory act B, I don’t see how this impacts the debate about salvation. I can’t think of a way in which God’s supererogatory saving of P1 would preclude Him from supererogatorily (?) saving P2.

"If the agent is choosing and acting freely, then it is less obvious that an omnibenevolent being does something wrong choosing damnation for him for those choices and actions."

That's right, but the worry about God's omnibenevolence for proponents of S isn't that God would be doing something wrong to this agent(the version of 3. I suggested makes this explicit); rather, it's that he didn't do something really great. I thought this was the point of that business about moral unsurpassability.

"Omnibenevolence requires not just fulfilling your obligations, but performing the best possible actions. This is the line taken by Bill Rowe in several places (lately in 'Can God be Free?' OUP 2004) and it looks to me exactly right."

This means there is still a serious problem, prima facie, even assuming free choice and action.

Mike,

On the first point, conceded. My only point was that if omnibenevolence is understood so as to require the performance of all supererogatory actions, we should be prepared for the likelihood that it's an incoherent notion. I do agree that it's plausible that it would require some supererogatory actions; but whether it would do so in matters relevant to Kevin's argument would depend entirely on what duties God has.

I don't think I understand your second point. Whatever omnibenevolence is, it surely is not a moral theory but a characteristic or attribute. If to be omnibenevolent someone must do mutually exclusive things, then we must allow that omnibenevolence in that sense is incoherent, in the sense that it's impossible to be omnibenevolent.

Christian,

I agree that someone could reasonably make the argument you suggest. I don't think it tells us anything about whether S or S-minus-4 is inconsistent with, or even in tension with, divine goodness, for the straightforward reason that anyone who accepts either will very likely simply disagree with you about what the divine duties are (some perhaps arguing that in the case of God we can't assume that God is obligated to do anything).

Supererogation doesn't necessarily involve any sort of self-sacrifice; assuming that supererogatory acts are possible, all that is needed for supererogation is the possibility of doing more than duty requires without violating any duties. Thus a governor's pardon or commuting of sentence is (legally) supererogatory because the law does not require that it ever be exercised, but it isn't inconsistent with it, either (and, in fact, is provided for by law). Nonetheless, a pardon doesn't necessarily involve any self-sacrifice on the part of the governor, precisely because the governor has the authority to pardon at will.

Kevin,

The problem is not whether saving P1 in and of itself precludes saving P2, but whether saving both P1 and P2 will under certain conditions preclude fulfilling the obligations of justice. To take the law analogy again, someone could well claim that the power to pardon needs to exist and occasionally be used for the sake of justice and the common good; but deny that justice and the common good are consistent with every criminal being pardoned. On such a view any given case of pardon will be supererogatory, but some sets of these supererogatory pardons will be suberogatory.

Whether there is any analogy in the divine case will depend on what sort of duties God might be said to have, and how these would influence the divine decisions. For instance, if (as Malebranche, for instance, once suggested) God has a duty to be as wise as possible in His governing of the world, and some sets of supererogatory actions are less wise than others, then some sets of supererogatory actions, each fine on their own, will be suberogatory, because while no particular action will violate any duties, some sets of such actions will (namely, those that are not as wise as possible).

Hope I'm not jumping in too late, but here goes.

Regarding A, I don't see any tension between 3 and 4 and God's goodness. If God owes salvation to no one, then I don't see how it can count against God's goodness if he doesn't provide it.

Regarding B, I'm inclined to say no. Apart from the assumption that God's goodness imposes no sort of obligation on God to effect salvation, I seriously doubt that 3 is compatible with divine goodness.

One more point: I think there is a tension between 1 and 3. If theological determinism is true, then I don't see how one can avoid a double predestination. Given premise 1, nothing is simply allowed by God since everything is decreed by Him.

Alan,

I agree with you that there is a tension between 1 and 3. If theological determinism is true, then at the end of the day, even if God doesn't bring about the person's salvation, supposing he has no obligation to, he still is the one ultimately responsible for bringing about the event of the individual's fall (however exactly that works). I'm also assuming that S (or 1 in particular) does not allow for counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.

That said, I still think there is an intelligible sense in which some things are allowed and other things are more directly caused or brought about by God. I'm thinking of the common primary and secondary causes distinction. God's being the ultimate cause doesn't eliminate the distinction. I may set up the dominos, hit the first and let the rest fall; or, I may set up the dominos, hit the first and (as if I could actually do this) just as each preceeding domino hits the following domino, with just the right force equivalent to the preceeding domino, knock over the second with my hand to create overdetermination. In the second illustration, I didn't allow anything to happen, where as in the first, it seems there is a sense in which I am allowing the events to take place in a way unlike the my direct influence in the second.

One of the main strategies (not just on this thread) for avoiding conflicts between divine goodness and the damnation of some is to say that God doesn't owe us salvation, hence damnation isn't unfair, etc. One problem with this, I believe, is that considerations of justice (duty, owing, fairness, etc.) are never, so to speak, the last word ethically. These rules are in place, where they are, for a higher end.

For example, my son has certain rules, and is punished if he breaks them. But the rules are designed to promote the harmony and flourishing of my son and the household of which he is a part. Similarly, the criminal law is a set of rules. But those rules are chosen for the common good of the society. And where common goods are not well served by rules, e.g. in friendships or the details of marriages, we don't have them.

Now, when it comes to matters of salvation, we may want to say that God does not owe anyone--there is no rule he has to follow. But that can only be justified, I think, if we say that there is no higher good that would be served by such a rule, or that some higher good would be violated by such a rule. And I am totally in the dark as to what higher good would fulfill either of these roles. It seems like God's saving everyone certainly would conduce to a higher good, namely eternal happiness for everyone. Perhaps universal salvation would violate the good of individual autonomy--this is the idea that the doors of hell are locked from the inside, that people make their own hell. This is not a bad idea but neither is it often defended as it needs to be: that God's violation of the autonomy of hell's denizens is either logically impossible or not conducive to the greater (common) good.

My point here is not so much to press on the idea of divine goodness. It's rather to say that we could expect God to adopt "rules", or a notion of justice, which has a place in a wider scheme, because deontology is always in the service of teleology. A bare appeal to rules, or who owes what, or justice, assumes such a scheme but does not make it explicit, and the context is peculiar and extreme enough that it needs to be made explicit.

Heath,

I'm in general agreement with what you say here, but this claim is not even close to obvious,

". . . because deontology is always in the service of teleology"

About half the people working in ethics will immediately reject this as flat assertion. Rawls, Gauthier, Nozick, Dworkin, Thomson (the list is pretty long) place questions of justice (far) above questions of beneficence. On these accounts (esp. the more libertarian accounts) it beneficence that is in the service of justice.
But this is not crucial to the point you're making. Putting it aside, I agree with you that the problem of damnation and divine goodness cannot be settled by appeal to justice alone. Certainly God is perfectly beneficent as well and that is where the problem arises: how to reconcile essential perfect *goodness* (not mere justice) with contingent damnation.

This reminds of a paper one of my old profs wrote, something like "The Paradox of Mercy and Justice" by Ned Markosian. I don't know if he published it.

Roughly, seems like mercy and justice are both necessary for perect virtue, but they are jointly incompatible, so perfect virtue is impossible. So, a perfect being is impossible. This is because being merciful is being disposed to give people more lenience than they deserve, but justice requires being disposed to give people exactly what they deserve.

Christian, there are ways around that in Christian theology. In particular, insofar as someone is united with Christ and Christ is punished adequately, then justice is met for that person.

I think there's an interesting set of complaints about traditional Christian theology that turn out to be inconsistent. One is the claim that it's morally abhorrent to allow people to suffer eternally when it can be avoided. The other is the critique of penal substitution that says that God would be unjust to allow Jesus to take people's penalty when they deserve it. I'm not sure if any careful thinker has made both claims (though I suspect someone has and just hasn't connected them), but I think the fact that the latter claim has some staying power in philosophical circles suggests that the former isn't as well-motivated by utterly obvious intuitions as some think.

Jeremy, I'm not sure I understand exactly. But, I wasn't defending the argument concerning mercy and justice, although I think there is something to it. One criticism of Christian theology you noted, that "the claim that it's morally abhorrent to allow people to suffer eternally when it can be avoided," is one I definitely think is correct. That is the one I intended when I said above that "I actually would say the idea is downright morally abominable, that God would either annihilate souls or allow them to freely remain in hell. If this is what Calvinist say, that strikes me as a very sad, sad thing."

Now, the theology behind Jesus's taking people's suffering is entirely foreign to me. But it is unclear how a reasonable view on it could provide support for the claim that good God could annihilate souls, for example. But maybe that is not what you are suggesting, I'm not sure.

Anyway, the idea of someone taking somebody's deserved penalty, strikes me as a very antiquated idea that doesn't really make any sense. More importantly, the idea presupposes that people deserve some punishment to be taken, and that is dubious to me. First, it is offensive to the idea that justice be proportional. Second, it relies upon a retributivist concept of justice that is incorrect. Third, it leaves non-human animals and children and retarded adults out of the picture. Fourth, it seems that Jesus's death and suffering would be gratuitous and that God could have "saved sinners" in a more convenient less objectionable way, like by not sending Jesus at all and just saving people by fiat.

But like I said, I don't know the debate on penal substitution. I am inclined to think the idea as described in the Bible is best read, for those who are committed to its importance, as symbolic, a convenient way at "getting at a bigger and better truth".

"God would be unjust to allow Jesus to take people's penalty when they deserve it".

This just doesn't square with our asymmetrical views on justice and beneficence/mercy. It is not generally considered unjust for an agrieved person S not to exact a punishment from someone S' who (say) has violated his rights.
I can certainly decide not to demand what is due to me, and no one views that as unjust. And that is because it isn't unjust. On the contrary, it is the prerogative of the aggrieved person not to demand everything due to them. It can certainly exhibit the virtue of mercy or beneficence not to make such a demand.
But there is an obvious asymmetry when it comes to demanding more (rather than less) than is due to me. I cannot do that without injustice.
Similarly, it is not unjust to allow a person S freely to make reparations to you for another S'. First, S does nothing unjust in not demanding what is due to you from S'. And second you do nothing wrong or unjust in allowing the sacrifice. But the asymmetry again holds. It would be unjust for S to demand more from S' than is due to you. And it would be unjust for you to allow that.
But I'm obviously saying nothing new here. These asymmetries very familiar and entrenched phenomena in moral experience.

I don't think Jeremy's two mentioned critiques are as inconsistent as he thinks they are. What would be inconsistent is to claim that

(1) Sending people who deserve it to hell would be just; but it's avoidable (there's no point in enforcing this); so it's morally abhorrent to do so;
(2) People deserve punishment for their wrongdoing, and if they don't get their punishment (because Jesus takes it on himself) that's morally abhorrent.

I think Jeremy is right that this would be trying to have your cake and eat it too. But I suspect that most critics of penal substitution don't have a problem with the absence of punishment for guilty parties; they have a problem with the inflicting of punishment on an innocent party. I don't think there's any conflict in holding this critique along with (1).

Mike suggests that if Jesus is freely "making reparations" on your behalf then there is no injustice going on. But here I think the problem is that we do not ordinarily think of punishment as a version of debt-payment. I can pay your debts; I cannot serve your jail time. This connects with my earlier point about teleology trumping deontology. The whole point of debt-payment is to restore money to the creditor, so it doesn't really matter where the money comes from. Whereas the point of jail time is to punish, or express wrath at, or morally transform, or whatever, the offender; so it matters a great deal who serves the jail time and it would undermine the whole point of the institution if we allowed substitute prisoners.

There's a lot more to say on this topic, on several sides, but if we get into the ethics of penal substitution views of atonement we might want to start a new thread.

Heath, you're talking about a different critique of penal substitution based on seeing the punishment of Jesus as punishment of an innocent (though I think most advocates of penal substitution would say that Jesus on the cross was guilty of the world's sin). I've seen both criticisms mentioned, sometimes separately and sometimes together. It's the one I mentioned that's inconsistent with Christian's point. The one you mention indeed is not, but that's not the objection I was talking about.

I've set up another post to continue this discussion, so we can get back to discussing the issues raised directly by Kevin's post here. I've already responded in the comments there to one issue raised by Mike and Heath here.