This post, and one to follow, address two recent papers by Michael Rea and Jeffery Brower "Understanding the Trinity" and "Material Constitution and the Trinity". I've been told that there is already a response to the Material Constitution paper in the most recent volume of F&P. Of course I still haven't received my copy of F&P. So, hopefully my remarks won't overlap too much with those in the journal, and if they do I beg your indulgence. What follows in this post is simply a rough sketch of Rea and Brower's position. I'll put up a follow-up post tomorrow with what I take to be some problems for their account.
In a couple of recent papers Rea and Brower suggest that a "much neglected solution" to the problem of material constitution has promise for explaining the doctrine of the Trinity. That much neglected account is Aristotle's account of Accidental Sameness, which is an attempt to solve the problem of material constitution. One particular problem of material constitution arises whenever it appears that an object X and an object Y share all of the same parts and yet have different modal properties. Arguably the best contemporary puzzles that illustrate the problem material constitution are David Wiggins cellulous/tree puzzle and Allan Gibbard's Lumpl/Goliath puzzle. In the case of Lumpl/Goliath the puzzle is that we are supposed to be inclined to think that the bronze of Goliath is a lump of bronze and a bronze statue. What initially seems like an implausible claim becomes clearer if we consider that the two things have identical material parts, yet they are not identical because they manifest different modal properties. That is to say that the lump is not identical with the statue because the statue but not the lump would be destroyed if the statue were melted down and recast into a different shape. It seems evident from the characterization of this particular problem of material constitution that a plausible solution could turn the problem cases into powerful analogies for the Trinity. The authors also rightly note that if such an analogy can be made it has the advantage of being "motivated by considerations independent of the problem of the Trinity."
In Aristotle's ontology particulars are hylomorphic compounds. A hylomorphic compound is when form and matter combine to make an individual thing. Note that a thing is not identical with its matter (elimitivism) nor is it identical with its form (idealism), and that forms can be thought of as kinds. For example trees depend on the continued instantiation of the kind tree by some matter. Hence, a collection of cellulous material does not make a tree unless it is configured tree-wise. Aristotle's account takes a turn for the weird in that he allows some wonky objects into his ontology. These weird objects include things like bent-tree, which is a thing that comes into existence when the tree is blown in the wind. Bent-tree is an accidental unity that comes about because substance (tree) takes on an accidental property (bentness). Aristotle denies that the relation that holds between an accidental unity and its parent substance is one of identity, but instead is one of numerical sameness without identity. On this view the two things, tree and bent-tree, are distinct things but are counted as one.
The weird objects of Aristotle's account may sound a little too odd to admit into ones ontology. Rea and Brower are only to happy to discount Aristotle's weird objects, as they aver that they do not need recourse to such objects since there are plenty of things that a significantly like these. The authors give examples of such similar compound objects like "fists and hands, bronze statues and lumps of bronze, cats and heaps of cat tissue, and so on." Once an individual can bring oneself to believe in the idea of numerical sameness without identity, then one has ready recourse to an explanation of the relation between such odd objects, and a solution to the problem of material constitution. In reflecting on the lump/statue example we can claim that the two objects represent different hylomorphic compounds. The authors illustrate the material constitution solution using the statue and lump of bronze example as follows:
"One can continue to believe that there are bronze statues and lumps of bronze, that every region occupied by a bronze statue is occupied by a lump of bronze, that no bronze statue is identical to a lump of bronze (after all, statues and lumps have different persistence conditions), but also that there are never two material objects occupying precisely the same place at the same time."If such an account seems counterintuitive one would be in good company. It seems that by definition any solution is going to be counterintuitive, even highly counterintuitive. Rea and Brower grant that numerical sameness without identity is counterintuitive, but then so is every other account.
At this point the relevance of the Aristotelian approach to the problem of material constitution as an approach to the problem of the Trinity should be clear. Like the lump and statue the persons of the Trinity can be thought of as hylomorphic compounds. The divine nature or essence then fills the role of matter and the properties of the persons can be taken as their forms. When these forms are instantiated by the divine essence each give rise to a distinct person. As Rea and Brower put it "each person will then be a compound structure whose matter is the divine essence and whose form is one of the three distinctive Trinitarian properties." The persons then are analogous to the particulars in the material constitution problems.
Hey Matt,
Nice post! Do you recall if Rea & Brewer specify how they understand the divine essence? On their account it cannot be identified with the omni properties because that would imply personhood and personhood, I take it, is supposed to be the individuating form added to the divine essence.
Thanks Ted! Rea & Brower do point out that there is a disanalogy in that the divine essence isn't material. They are vague on what the essence is, but I take it that it is something substance like. So, you might think of creedal statements to the effect that son is "of one substance with the Father".