I've sat on the following thinking it may raise a few hackles, but I throw caution to the wind.
Visitors to my home department are frequently startled at the number of people interested in philosophy of religion in our program. They are also taken aback by the number of theists. They are sometimes surprised that on the faculty we have a Rabbi, an Episcopal priest, and a Chair with an AOS in philosophy of religion. (I'm sure there is a joke latent here!) These visitors are quick to inform me that this is certainly not the norm, and that philosophy of religion, and theism in general, are something of odd anomaly in most places. This isn't simply something I've seen locally as I sometimes get the same kind of response when I travel, or talk to friends at other programs. Now I have no idea if it is true that philosophy of religion is viewed so dimly, though I speculate that it might be true in some programs. If you work in metaphysics or epistemology it can seem a hard claim to buy if one looks at the top people in those areas. However, I want to treat the claim as true for the purposes of discussion because I suspect that philosophy of religion suffers a handicap where other areas don't.
Philosophy of religion, unlike any other area I can think of, has a unique subculture that many are likely to cast a baleful eye on... Christian apologetics. Philosophy of religion and Christian apologetics can be hard to distinguish. You may even think that there isn't a distinction to be made. My initial thoughts on this are that apologetics is essentially defensive, whereas philosophy of religion is about following the arguments where they lead. (This is perhaps why there are so many universalists in the later camp.) It seems to be the case that people doing serious work in apologetics see no distinction between their endeavors and those of philosophy, whereas those who see themselves as philosophers are often at pains to distinguish their work from that of apologists. Part of the problem is that much of the philosophical community, including many doing philosophy of religion, are going to look on apologetics as very bad philosophy. (If they think it counts as philosophy at all.)
So I put this up for discussion with a few things in mind.
- Is philosophy of religion really so ill thought of?
- Should recent PhD's downplay their work in philosophy of relgion?
- Is there really a distinction to be drawn here?
- Do philosophers who engage in both do philosophy a disservice?
- Should philosopher seek to distance themselves from apologists, or should they step in and make better argements?
My department has been so intent on retaining positions in the history of philosophy, epistemology, and philosophy of science due to losses in those areas, but no one seems all that interested in our biggest lack, which is philosophy of religion. You might have thought that a department that had Alston and van Inwagen would want to continue that tradition, but the powers that be don't seem to think it's a worthy field to insist on having someone in. As it is, they have the undergrad philosophy of religion course being taught by a religion adjunct who does mostly Job and Kierkegaard. There's no contemporary philosophy of religion being taught even at the undergrad level except for one senior seminar Mark Heller did on arguments for the existence of God, and that was a one-time thing. He doesn't list it as an AOS or AOC.
I don't see any reason to downplay work in philosophy of religion, but some places might be more impressed by it than others, and it may do to play it up at some schools.
I find van Inwagen's distinction between apologetics and philosophy of religion to be very strange. His collection of papers on philosophy of religion is, to his mind, not philosophy. Those who try to emphasize the distinction remind me too much of that, because he's clearly doing philosophy in every one of those papers. As you've explained the distinction, though, it does seem to be a real distinction.
But I don't see how one couldn't follow the arguments wherever they go and then use the ones that go where the apologist would like in apologetical contexts. Thus I think Christian apologetics can use good philosophy, and I can't object to those who do both. I'm not sure how it would detract from philosophy as a discipline except where people don't make the proper distinctions when they should and forget which task they're doing.
On the last question, I think the answer is obvious. Philosophers should point out where apologists have gotten the arguments wrong. There's nothing that annoys me more in philosophy than someone who says something I agree with but then supports it with an absolutely terrible argument. This is extremely common in apologetics, but Christian apologetics and the mainstream of apologists from the atheist/skeptic side seem to me to mix all sorts of cheap and awful arguments with considerations that should be (but aren't usually) given more consideration.
I studied philosophy at Virginia Tech, and there was equal respect for the philosophy of religion as for Aesthetics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of science. The philosophy of religion is often critical of religious thought, so I see no demand for dogma that would detract from a philosopher’s general objectivity.
Matt, here's my quick answers to your questions. First, PR is viewed with suspicion in philosophy. I advise my students to leave it out when applying for standard jobs unless they can find a reason to think that it would be viewed positively. And I advise students not to write dissertations in the area and wait to work in it until after tenure. This advise is probably overblown, but I don't like risks. The last three questions I think are too general. There's bad philosophy everywhere, and I agree with Jeremy: it's distressing to find someone defending a view you like with a horrible argument...
Oh, and Jeremy, it sounds like you might be happier at a place that takes PR seriously...and on a completely unrelated note :-), our PR conference starts up tomorrow!
I wonder if the difference between those doing Christian Apologetics and those doing Philosophy of Religion is akin to the difference between pop philosophers and academic philosophers. Apologists tend to have their arguments packaged up in a pretty little box ready for common everyday consumption. This results in a lot of really bad arguments being made. Those doing the philosophy of religion are true 'academics' - while they see the application of the argument, they do not want to see the argument used until it is just perfect. And anyone who has ever done philosophy knows that no complex philosophical argument is ever perfect, much less an argument which includes, as a variable, any kind of deity.
Should philosophers distance themselves from apologists? I don't think so. But I wish that apologists would not consider themselves so much 'practical' philosophers that they fail to engage in the rigorus argumentation that every philosopher must do - I know of more than one major apologist who could use a semester in PHIL145 - Critical Thinking before going back out to stand on their soapbox.
I am going to echo JK's remarks mostly. But in our department (which is an atypically young one), nobody works in PR. And I have been advised, more than once, not mention my interest in PR at all when applying to PhD programs. I think I may have refered to one PR paper in my personal statement, but only after spending two paragraphs making it explicit that I am first and foremost interested in a traditional M & E AOS.
Ironically, though none of our faculty work in PR, the interest in PR among our grad students is quite high. I take this as a good sign that Philosophy departments are (to their credit) resisting the current academic trend of treating students like customers and tailoring their curriculum to suit student interests.
It might be worth noting that many of the best people doing philosophy of religion argue for atheism. Jordan Howard Sobel's _Logic and Theism_ for instance line's up nicely with Mackie's _Miracle of Theism_ in arguing against theism. But there is Rowe and R. Gale and G. Oppy and Quentin Smith and lots of others that couldn't be farther from doing apologetics. But like almost everyone who works in philosophy of religion, I think it's probably a good idea to specialize as well in ethics or metaphysics or epistemology, etc. (ideally, lots of these).
A few passing comments as I get ready to head up to Mizzou's PR conference. The logs show we got twice as many page loads than an average day, so there must be some interest in the topic. It's nice that Notre Dame ties a computer users name to their PC so you can see exactly who visited even if they didn't leave a comment.
The consensus so far seems to be that PR is suspect, but nobody has offered much analysis as to why. I'd hate to think that there are that many philosophers who find all matters of religion irrational. I'd thought that folks like Alston and Planting, among others, had made a good case for the rationality of religious belief. Then again I heard the following just yesterday :
It sounds as if a number of people are getting, or giving, the same advice about downplaying their work in PR. I think the advice I got was about word for word what Jon wrote. Participating here probably blows any chance of smuggling myself in somewhere.
Mike brings up a good point about atheist working in PR, but I think they probably represent a significant minority within the field. I also think that if theists stopped doing PR tomorrow, then much of the work for atheist in the field would dry up. That is, even without arguments for atheism, theist would still be engaged in positive projects about the nature of God, freedom and foreknowledge, etc. I don't see the same happening for atheists under similar circumstances. Atheists do prod the field in certain directions, but it still seems that much of the work that is done within PR has a serious Christian bent. My suggestion is that this Christian orientation colors the field, and makes the apologetics association easier to some minds.
Given Syracuse's history it does seem a little odd/embarrassing that they don’t have anyone competent to teach philosophy of religion at the graduate level. What do philosophy of religion, medieval philosophy, and American pragmatism have in common... three broad areas you don't have to know a thing about in order to get a PhD in philosophy.
It's not exactly true that Syracuse has no one to teach philosophy of religion at the graduate level. We have no one able to teach analytic philosophy of religion at the graduate level. We happen to have one of the top continental philosophers of religion in the world, John Caputo, and he's even being paid for by the Religion Department, but he does one graduate philosophy class every semester. But the analytic philosophers in our department don't consider this to count as having replaced Alston and van Inwagen in this area. They just see no need to replace them. Replacing them with metaphysicians and epistemologists is enough for them.
I wouldn't worry about people who are uninterested in philosophy of religion finding you here or caring if they do. People with an animus against it might find you here in a way that would affect things, but the uninterested shouldn't care enough for it to matter.
I don't think listing it is the problem, either. I've simply been told not to emphasize it. (This wasn't by anyone still at the department, either. It was by someone who has published much in philosophy of religion but is best known for other work, someone who was interested in hiring philosophers of religion and medievalists.) Since my only publication so far is a book review on God and time, I don't have much choice. I have to list it as an AOS if I want to show that I've published something in one of my areas of specialization. It's just that I'd probably list metaphysics and philosophy of race first unless the job specifically listed philosophy of religion as an interest. Given that my dissertation will likely not touch philosophy of religion, this is probably a more honest ordering anyway.
It is strange how first hand accounts can differ. I will take up the first question because of time constraints...I am heading to the PR conference today as well :) Quentin Smith offered his account of the the state of PR in this 2001 article:
http://qsmithwmu.com/metaphilosophy_of_naturalism.htm
Now, this does not really answer the question that Matt is asking, but it does serve to show that Quentin Smith has observed the upswing in PR of the last decades. Does it follow that PR is ill thought of? One might gleen that it is not as ill thought of as Matt's experience infers. I guess you might also think that it depends on who's doing the ill thinking. I might say that it is less ill thought of than 30 years ago, but that leaves a lot of wiggle room to say that overall it may still be considered not worthy of the respect that the other areas maintain. If this is the case, the part I have trouble with is that even though theism may be false, surely it serves as a very stimulating philosophical venture that plumbs the depths and traverses the width of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and other areas. Even though this is minimalistic, surely there is worthwhile residual knowledge from these exercises that rubs off on these other "primary" areas? Is there not something respectable about this? I tend to think so.
More of a question, really, for anyone who wants to dive in to a related topic... I'm applying for a PhD in Religious Studies (with a soon to be completed MA in Philosophy). There are faculty at some of these programs who list "philosophy of religion" as part of their interests, and who have published in phenomenology, existentialism, metaphysics, etc. However, my hunch is that philosophy PhD programs look askance at religion PhD programs-- perhaps how English PhDs have tended to view Comp Lit PhDs.
Does anyone have anything to add that justifies or disqualifies my hunch as to this divide in academia?
I think that much of the current distrust of philosophy of religion has to do with its use for apologetic purposes. Many philosophers also find the attitude that many religious philosophers have toward philosophy to be, well, unphilosophical. Rather than using reason in a disinterested search for truth, philosophy is used by the religious to defend major metaphysical theses that they bring with them to their philosophical pursuits. Whether nonreligious philosophers bring major metaphyiscal baggage to their own philosophizing less often than religious philosophers do is, of course, open for debate.
One other complaint I've heard along these lines: some graduate students (and later professors) who are religious and who work in philosophy of religion aren't generally interested in philosophy. They just want to articulate and defend theism (or Christianity). This is found annoying at best and an abuse of philosophy at worst.
When I travel the blogsphere and read through Chalmers list of online philosophy papers I am constantly suprised at the number of theists there are working in philosophy. I think maybe the situation, for better or worse, is starting to change, and religion is being reintergated into mainstream philosophy, that's just my impression anyway.