In Ed Wierenga's _The Nature of God_ he mention three main attributes: wisdom, power, and goodness. Hoffman and Rosenkrantz' _The Divine Attributes_ also mention these three as the ''core'' attributes. Swinburne has suggested (in conversation at least) that perhaps moral goodness can be derived from wisdom and power (of course some, like Aquinas, have conceived of God's goodness as ontic rather than moral in the contemporary sense, but I'll focus on moral goodness). I want to investigate that a little bit. One motivation is just to satisfy curiosity about the logical structure of God's attributes. Historically, Aquinas derived most of God's attributes from His being pure actuality. Also—and this is Swinburne's main motivation—arguments to the existence of God as an explanation of observed phenomena benefit from theism being a simple hypothesis and one kind of simplicity is a broadly structural simplicity entailed by an entity having few properties. Finally, since the attributes in question are the traditional ''communicable'' attributes, we could learn something about the idealization of our own core attributes by thinking about how they are related in God. I'll put an attempted derivation of omnibenevolence from omnipotence and omniscience below the fold.
The intuitive version of the argument to moral goodness from unlimited knowledge and power is that a being with perfect knowledge would know what the good and the right are and, being all powerful, would not be prevented from acting on this knowledge. This clearly assumes that knowledge that something is the right thing to do (for now I'll just take that as primitive, though I personally make the right a function of the good) provides an intrinsic motivation to perform that action. It also assumes some kind of moral realism robust enough for there to be moral facts which can be known. I have no objection to either assumption, but neither will I defend them as my purpose is merely to see if I can come up with a valid version of the argument. I will now try to convert the intuitive argument into a valid logical argument.
- God has unlimited knowledge. A
- God has unlimited power. A
- There are moral facts. A
- For any S uninfluenced by non-rational forces, if S knows that φ is the right action to perform in arbitrary circumstance C, then if S is not constrained by outside forces, S φ's in C. A
- God knows the right thing to do in any circumstance. 1,3
- God is uninfluenced by non-rational forces 1,2
- God is not constrained by outside forces. 2
- God does the right action in any given circumstance. 4,5,6,7 MP
- If 8, then God is morally perfect.
- God is morally perfect. 8,9 MP
9 could be objected to on the basis of a contrary moral theory, but I think it would not be hard to adapt the argument to a favored (cognitivist) moral theory. Certainly that's not the interesting way out. I would like to be able to say more about 6, but I think the inference is a good one. I think this is a reasonable argument, so I think it's reasonable to think that God's cognitive and dynamic life entail his moral goodness if you hold an internalist cognitivist moral theory. Obviously, 8 needs some massaging in light of Rowe-style arguments but because we've already discussed that a bit and I'm slated to read the book in a month I'd like to sidestep issues directly pertaining to that right now. I suppose if the only way to get out of the argument were on the basis of a different moral theory or Rowe-style worries I'd feel pretty good about the argument.
Ed pointed out that 4 needs to be understood so as to handle ties, so I'll read ''right action'' to allow for satisficing. He also pointed out it implies that wicked people are either ignorant of under the influence of irrational forces. He specifically mentioned Lucifer, I imagine because he was supposed to be very knowledgeable and didn't have any bad influences.
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Note on the doctrine of simplicity: I'm just going to bracket discussion of that for the answer seems pretty clear there. Also, Swinburne suggests in _The Christian God_ that the attributes ''fit together'' in a property called Maximal Intensional Power. My recollection, though, is that it's like a complex property so apart from progress in analyzing it, it doesn't seem that it yields a solid answer of ''one.'' Ah, actually I just noticed that on p. 151 S. explicitly makes the claim that perfect goodness follows from perfect freedom and omniscience. It will be interested to see how well I've represented his line of thinking.
I'm not sure how weakness of will is supposed to be ruled out simply on omniscience and omnipotence grounds. I can imagine a being who happens to know everything, including what is right and what ought to be done, who has the ability to do it, but who simply refuses. That would mean 6 doesn't follow from 1 and 2 but would need to be established independently. Why couldn't someone know everything and be able to do anything but for irrational reasons simply not want to? It would just be irrelevant that the being is omniscient if knowing isn't enough to overcome irrationality.
The solution might be simple, though. You wouldn't need to postulate perfect goodness at the ground level. You could simply include perfect rationality in addition to omniscience and omnipotence.
"Why couldn't someone know everything and be able to do anything but for irrational reasons simply not want to?"
I do think that omniscience implies rationality, but the assumption of ethical internalism should rule the situation out anyway.
I suppose it would, I guess. So my suggested revision would be necessary for anyone less internalist about such matters. If some sort of externalism is correct, I don't think omniscience should imply the kind of rationality important here.
I think that's right. Though my original intent was just to see if the argument worked on those assumptions, I'm now getting more interested in whether the conclusion can be got without that assumption.
It seems to me that if internalism isn't true for humans, it's because of some flaw in human nature that wouldn't prevent God from being motivated when he knows that something is (among) the best actions in a situation. In this way even if internalism isn't a conceptual truth, it would nevertheless describe the mental life of God.
I'd agree with you in that I think every sentence you said is true. But I'm not sure you can say that at this point in the discussion. What is it about God that justifies saying that? Ontic perfection in the Thomistic sense would, but you're not starting with that. Does omniscience by itself justify an inability to do the irrational? I'm not so sure about that.
Right. I don't have a clear or firm view of this right now but I do think that omniscience and omnipotence imply perfect cognition simpliciter.
It would be easier simply to replace the traditional omniscience with perfect cognition, but I'd like to see if I could support--beyond my bare intuition, which, in the absence of countervailing evidence, is often enough for rational belief--the move from the omni's to perfect rationality.
The core of the intuition is something like this: If God is omniscient then he knows two important items: 1. All the true principles of rationality. 2. All the right value of ends.
Since, via omnipotence, there's nothing stopping Him from being rational: there seems to be no "room" for irrationality: where would it come from?
It looks like I'm just reiterating the assumption of motivational internalism, but perhaps there's a basis for defense here.
There might be some merit to framing it that way. If you want to think of irrationality in the face of some item of knowledge as some inability that an omnipotent being wouldn't have, you might be able to get somewhere with this. I guess the question is whether there's an alternative way to thinking about it that doesn't have that key feature. What I was assuming is that it was simply a matter of the will, but the problem might be that you'd need an explanation of why the will isn't in step with the knowledge in question. You could explain that if you wanted to place some limit on acting, but that would violate omnipotence. Now I'm not sure exactly how I'd want to think of it. Part of my problem, though, is that I'm a compatibilist, and I think there are explanations for why we act. I don't know if libertarians will be as worried about this sort of thing.
4. For any S uninfluenced by non-rational forces, if S knows that φ is the right action to perform in arbitrary circumstance C, then if S is not constrained by outside forces, S φ's in C. A
Trent, (4) above seems to me too strong to be true. Notice that (4) provides an unusual excusing (or at least palliative) condition for any near-omnipotent and all-knowing being that fails to act morally. The excuse (4) ensures is that some outside non-rational force must have influenced such a being's actions (otherwise, of course, given (4), he'd do what is morally right).
You don't want to say (do you?) that there cannot be a powerful and omniscient being who acts immorally and for whom there are no mitigating circumstances?
I'll have to think about that, I think the problem is inhereted from the internalism and though I still think the view the best on balance it is an admited cost of the view that it tends to seem to exculpate.
I think akrasia explains a lot of cases of not acting on reason and I do think exculpating ignorance is more widespread than I once did.
My fundamental intuition is that whatever weakness might make internalism false for non-perfecte agents doesn't hold for perfect ones. To my chagrin, I don't have an argument for this.
As to your specific quesion, though, first, I don't think that the presence of non-rational forces are always mitigating: I think there are plenty of cases where one has willfully opened oneself up to the non-rational forces. Not sure about a regress on that.
Second, I'm not sure I'm unhappy about the inevitable presence of mitigating factors. A mitigation does not necessarily ammount to an exculpation.
Universalists would probably embrace the consequence warmly.
Trent, you say,
"first, I don't think that the presence of non-rational forces are always mitigating: I think there are plenty of cases where one has willfully opened oneself up to the non-rational forces. Not sure about a regress on that."
I don't think so either. But we are talking about a specific case of an omniscient being who (unlike the near-perfect being you describe) has omniscience but not the ability (i.e., the omnipotence) necessary to resist non-rational forces. So suppose this being desires to cause me pain and does so. According to (4) he is not to blame for what he does since, given his properties (specifically his omniscience and power), he will have done all that he could do to resist this temptation and "all he could do" will not have been enough. Off the hook. I guess I want to deny that there is any plausible form of internalism that entails that strong sort of motivation. The sort of being that I'm suggesting is possible might know an awful lot, including precisely what the right actions are, and willfully not do what is right. It's not that he succumbed to non-rational forces, but more like he simply cares more about doing harm than he does about morality. Anyway, that's the idea.
Mike, weren't we assuming omnipotence? If so, the way you've described it can't be the explanation for weakness of will.
Hmmm. 4 doesn't say anything about blame, so I suppose we're just taking for granted that
Of course, it's not *quite* that simple, for a drunk driver might do all in his power to avoid running over the child, but he's not exculpated for he is culpable for being in the powerless position he's in. Still, I suppose we can stipulate that we're not talking about such a case.
I think the entailment I'm not seeing the warrant for is from
to
Can you help me see that or correct my interp?
Maybe I've got this wrong. I read the post as urging that we can go from omniscience and omnipotence to perfect goodness. The attribute of omniscience (on your view) does all the work in ensuring that we know what is right and all the work in generating sufficient motivation to do what is right. Omnipotence does all the work in ensuring that no obstacle to doing what is right is insurmountable. Is this the idea?
I then considered an agent who was omniscient but less-than-omnipotent. This being would have all the motivation you ascribe to beings who are omniscient. But such a being would not have all of the power of beings who are omnipotent. In particular such a being would not have the power to overcome all non-rational forces, though they would be no less motivated than perfect beings to do so.
So if such a being failed to do what is right then, given (4), this could only be attributed to their lack of power in overcoming non-rational forces (it could not be attributed to their lack of motivation). Their omniscience ensures that the required motivation is present. All that might be missing is the power to act rightly. But then, on this view, the failure to act rightly is not blameworthy. There is nothing these beings might have done to acquire to power necessary to do what is right and they could not be more motivated to do what is right.
It is beyond the present point, but I want to claim that, possibly, omniscient and near-omispotent beings are blameworthy in these cases.
Do I just have your idea wrong?
Mike,
I now see the force of your point. I'll present a few possible lines of reply.
1. For various reasons (some having to do with the Incarnation) I think omniscience should be characterized as the *ability* to know all truths (it's logically possible to know). In the absence omniscience it is not guaranteed that this ability will be actualized. If it is not, then it's possible that the being have culpable ignorance. I happen to think that a *lot* of our culpability is in giving in to desires to ignore important evidence, so it seems that this could also happen with the beings you describe.
2. It could be that what you've discovered is that omniscience depends on omnipotence.
3. It could be that you've discovered a possible kind of being which could not be culpable for wrongdoing. I see no problem with the possibility of this kind of being and if you'd asked me in another context whether such a being were possible I suspect I'd have said "Sure, why not?" If option 2 is no good--I suspect something could be made of it though--then I'm inclined to say that if such beings are possible, then you have a good argument that they couldn't possibly be culpable. That sounds right to me.
This is just my thought, as an undergraduate. But doesn't belief in moral facts sort of contradict internalism, I think it would be diffcult to hold both.
Here's a thought, maybe omnipotence implies omniscience. Basically omniscience is the ability to preform all tasks, acquiring knowledge of everything is a task, therefore any omnipotent being can choose to be omniscient. The problem with this line of arguement is it means that god only has omniscience by his own choice, and not by neccessity, I wonder if this might be, from a christian perspective, a little hetrorthodox.
By the way, what about omnipresence?