The Philadelphia Inquirer has a brief review of Keith Ward's newish book The Case for Religion. Ward is the Regius Professor of Divinity and head of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Oxford, and former Professor of History and Philosophy of Religion at the University of London. This quote, which put me in mind of James, will probably prod me into purchasing the book.
Ward's "case for religion" rests on denying that truth can only be arrived at by means of "publicly accessible, repeatable and testable evidence." Religious belief, he says, "is not fundamentally a matter of evidence. Religion may be based on experience, but that is very different from saying that it is based on evidence."
Freud aside I have always thought that the argument from religious experience is rather compelling. I set Freud aside because he is the common objection, but following William Alston I'm always curious as to why people should be troubled by the unsubstantiated claims of speculative psychology. I should add that contra James I think the argument is strong justification for others to believe in the existence of God. One might consider something like CD Broad's argument:
1. There is an enormous unanimity among mystics in regards to the spiritual nature of reality.2. When there is such unanimity among observers as to their experience it is reasonable to think their experiences are verdical unless we have reason to believe they are deluded.
3. There is no good reason to think these experiences are delusive
4. ∴ It is reasonable to believe the mystical experiences are verdical.
Obviously 3 is going to take a drubbing, but I think that if one emphasizes the good reasons aspect the case can be made. One can certainly grant that we might consider some cases delusive, but I cannot see good reason to think all or most are.
Your argument needs to differentiate between the experience and the reporter's interpretation/explanation of the experience. Just because we can/do/should accept that someone had an experience which they perceive as important and profound doesn't mean that we should accept what they claim about the nature of that experience.
Alleged unanimity among mystics won't quite do it because we are all, after all, human. We're more alike than different - we perceive natural things (colors, shapes) in much the same way. So, IF there is a natural origin to these experiences, we should expect similar reports.
I've always thought that the argument from religious experience had a certain strength to it. In order for it to be cogent, only one of the billions of religious experiences needs to be veridical. In order for the argument to be proven false, every one of the billions of religious experiences must be false. With these large numbers, and the remarkable burden of proof that rests on those who wish to reject the argument, it seems that the argument from religious experience has a certain initial plausibility to it.
Joe-
Unless we have good reason to think the experiences are delusive then I do not see why we should not accept the testimony in regards to the spiritual nature of reality. Your speculative point about natural origins is interesting but it lacks evidence. Suppose I grant that there is a natural connection to such experiences. Let's say that there is a portion of the brain related to religious experience and that through manipulation by chemical substances or mechanical means we could produce a religious experience in the individual. We would still be left to wonder what stimulates this region in "the wild" so to speak. But why suppose that when we do stimulate this region we are not opening peep-hole to the "super-sensitive world?" (Gutting)
Johnny-Dee-
Thanks for the solidarity! :) I certainly think you are right about the initial plausibility of the argument. I notice though that Jon Kvanvig takes issue with your comment. It will be interesting to see what kind of comments Kvanvig gets.
One thing I'll add is that I've often thought that the more interesting question is why there are a few people who do not have religious experiences. You might wonder if an individual should question their own cognitive faculties when confronted with the lack of such experiences given such wide spread reports of religious experience. CD Broad has an interesting analogy about how the few people who do not have religious experiences are similar to the few people who are tone deaf. Should the tone deaf person think the vast number of people reporting experiences of musical pitch are simply delusional?