Last month's issue of Prospect Magazine has an interesting exchange between theologian Keith Ward and philosopher AC Grayling on the problem of evil. I am no doubt biased, but I thought Ward gave a tidy response to the problem, even invoking some modal skepticism:
"The traditional philosophers' criticism is that, if God were omnipotent, surely God could create better laws or a better universe with us in it. I am inclined simply to deny this, and to deny that anyone could know it was true."
Grayling's reply takes a less than generous reading, misconstruing what Ward has to say on the problem, and throws in a scattering of rhetorical barbs along the way. I think there are good ways to make the atheistic argument, unfortunately I don't think Grayling provides such a model here. For example Grayling says:
To say both that God makes us suffer natural disasters for our ultimate good, and that the natural disasters that cause such suffering lie outside God's control, is to assert a contradiction: you are saying that God does what he cannot do.
But of course Ward said nothing of the sort. It is not the case that God makes us suffer the disasters for our ultimate good, or that God could not prevent natural disasters. Simply it is possible that the only world God could create with us in it is one in which in which suffering will result. If this is God causing us to suffer it is only in the most indirect sense.
The problem is that Christians see God (I don't have to tell you) as an active participant in his creation. Christians will grant that he has intervened in the course of natural events (e.g., the Flood, plagues), and that with infinitesimal effort he could (if he desired it) intervene save a drowning baby here or there. And yet in many cases he doesn't.
The only justifications for his nonaction would seem to be (1) that he feels he owes no duty to a baby, (2) that (as you say) the only world he could create is the one in which the baby dies, or (3) that on the whole it is better that the baby die.
I trust most Christians won't take to the idea that God holds himself to a lower moral standard than humans hold themselves, so justification (1) is out. Justification (2) doesn't explain why God doesn't just intervene and save the baby. And justification (3) casts God as Cosmic Consequentialist, which you yourself explicitly deny is the case.
So even if we grant Ward's modal intuitions, they seem to be insufficient to defeat the problem of evil as it stands for Christians.
I have some embryonic thoughts on Strange Doctrines' objection. I think option 1 is actually an intriguing one. I wouldn't be comfortable saying that God owes no duty to the baby, but I don't think His duty could be compared to ours in the sense that He would be immoral if He did not do what we should do in all cases. My relationship with an individual is different than God's relationship with that individual. Life and death are not mine to give to people, but they are God's, so it is appropriate for Him to allow a baby to die. This does not make God some sort of sadist, however, because He is not deriving some sort of pleasure out of the death of the child itself.
As an anology, it would be wrong for me to imprison someone against their will, but it would not be wrong for the government to do so (under the right circumstances). This is because they are in a different relationship with that individual than I am. It is withing their authority to imprison, just as life and death are withing God's authority.
A potential objection would be, "would it then be acceptable for God to agonizingly torture someone for a million years in the process of letting them die?" As I said before, God derives no pleasure directly from the death of an individual, and I think that goes for their pain as well. Also, that question has less to do with God's authority over life and death and more to do with God's character, which would not allow torture for no reason. I could see a jumping off point to a discussion of the problem of Hell here, but I'll not take that on. I'm not trying to write a book, after all. Suffice it to say right now that I don't think people are in Hell for no reason.
As I said, these are embryonic thoughts, so I wouldn't be surprised to hear some good objections.
The first problem for theology is not to explain why God doesn't intervene, but to explain the interventions. If there are no supernatural interventions, then theology doesn't get off the ground, and there is no problem of evil. If supernatural interventions for the good do occur, then the problem of evil doesn't negate the implication of the existence of a benevolent supernatural power. But atheism has not demonstrated the non-existence of the supernatural.
Matthew,
If I read you correctly, you are saying that it is false to say:
(1) God makes us suffer for our ultimate good.
If I'm reading you right, you reject (1) because while God can see that our suffering will result from the creative act, it is not the case that God acts with the intention of making us suffer for some ultimate good. He's not like a coach who makes players run long distances on a hot summer day because the suffering they undergo will bring about some ultimate good (endurance, strength, etc). Given what you say towards the end of the discussion, it seems you'd be willing to accept:
(2) God allows us to suffer for our ultimate good.
The idea, if I'm reading you right, is that foreknowledge is an imperfect guide to intention. Some things aren't intended but merely foreseen. Those that aren't intended fall into the acceptable but perhaps unfortunate cost category. Am I reading you right?
All,
To be clear I just wanted to highlight an interesting discussion, and mark Grayling’s less than generous roll in the discussion. I really thought that it serves as an example of how these things shouldn’t be done. There post isn’t an argument of my own in regards to the POE.
I am in Dallas this weekend for the SWCRS Conference. That said I will try to respond to some of your points in a quick fashion.
SD,
I actually think that two holds. It seems that any explaination for why it is the case that the only world he could create is the one in which the baby dies would explain why God doesn't just intervene and save the baby.
HV,
A posteriori design arguments could get a theology off the ground without supernatural interventions, but I take your point.
Clayton,
Well I didn't say it, but I'd probably accept something along those lines.
Matt, the problem is that Christians believe that God has intervened in the past. So there is no warrant for the claim that his creation is itself explanation enough for his nonintervention.
Let me just speak from my own moral perspective. Nothing strikes me as more straightforward than that if I saw a helpless baby about to perish due to some natural evil, I would expend the greatest effort to save it. If I had supernatural powers and that were the only means at my disposal, I would certainly not hesitate to use those. And I certainly wouldn't think my duty attenuated had I "created" the baby myself via some method suitably analogous to God's; if anything, the reverse would be true.
But if we assume God exists, one must assume that God clearly takes a different view: though it would only require an iota of effort by me to save it, let the baby die.
That view strikes me as amoral, at best. And if we were talking about any conceivable agent other than God, I think every Christian would agree with my assessment. The question then becomes (in my mind, anyway) why a Christian would hold God to an arguably lower moral standard than they would any other conceivable entity.
Sorry Matthew, hope the "Matt" was okay.
To be clear all that I claimed in response to HV, was that a posteriori design arguments could get a theology off the ground without supernatural interventions, not Christian theology. Hence the “I take your point.”
That said I don’t think that anything I’ve said means that we have to hold God to any different moral standard. It seems likely that all things being equal you do have a duty to rescue a helpless baby, but it isn’t clear to me that God has the same obligation. Why? Well you have finite knowledge about what your actions will bring about except for the immediate good, but God’s knowledge is supposed to be different right. It may be the case that any world in which God rescues that baby it turns out to be Attila the Hun.
Matthew,
With all due respect, this strikes me as incredibly ad hoc:
Why? Well you have finite knowledge about what your actions will bring about except for the immediate good, but God’s knowledge is supposed to be different right.
According to this report 250 children under the age of 5 drown in swimming pools every year. According to SD (I'm assuming) and me, anyone in a position to save one of these children is morally required to do so and isn't merely under the reasonable but mistaken impression that this is so. Your view can't be that we can reasonably conclude from the fact that God didn't intervene on behalf of these kids that the kids who did drown really shouldn't have been saved.
The only way I can see you avoiding this result, given what you've said so far, is by adopting a view of the sort Frank Jackson defends according to which our moral obligations are evidence-relative (see his 'Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection' in Ethics 1991). He thinks that what you ought to do is in part a function of reasonably expected outcomes and not actual outcomes. Thus, owing to the significant differences in God's probability assessments and our own, we are both under the general obligation to maximize expected moral utility (you can modify the idea for non-consequentialist frameworks as well if you wish) but the concrete or particular obligations this puts us under differs. This seems to allow knowledge to play a role in determining our obligations. Thoughts?
The reason I thought you were committed to (2) but not (1) had to do with intention and foresight. You can forsee that there are consequences of your intentionally ?-ing without intending to bring that consequence about. Insofar as you regard this consequence as acceptable given what speaks in favor of ?-ing, it seems that you are allowing the consequence to come about given your reasons for ?-ing in the first place.
It might be thought by some, then, that (2) is easier to defend to (1). It is morally objectionable for God to make us suffer, perhaps, but not to allow us to suffer if it is better for God to ? than not.
There are two problems with (2), however. First, on the view being developed, we have to think of the suffering of others as an acceptable loss for sustaining a world such as this. I think this attitude towards the suffering of others is itself morally objectionable. Second, there are difficult questions about consent and treating persons as ends that the theist who goes this route needs to deal with. If you know that there are persons who would not consent to being placed in situations or roles but you place them there because of some aim, noble or not, it seems that you are treating these persons as mere means. I'm reasonably certain that no one would consent to being born into the sort of situation we have currently in Sudan.
"Well you have finite knowledge..."
But finite knowledge never kept a Christian from judging that God is good. How is it, then, that finite knowledge makes a Christian incompetent to judge whether God's actions are good?
Whenever theodicy comes up, I am always intrigued by the observation that the concept of GOD automatically leads to a contradiction--in essence, "If God is infinitely powerful, benevolent, and omniscient, how does he let bad things happen." Then huge amounts of energy are spent trying to explain it.
If God will not or cannot violate the laws of nature, much of this disappears. If God only works through people, then only people are the moral actors.
But Bill, humans have "free will," and so to the extent that God "acts through them" he is subverting that freedom.
Clayton,
I do have thoughts on what you wrote, but it will have to wait until next week. (Spring Break) Apologies but I'm backed up after going to this conference.
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