In the wake of the recent Asian tsunami there have been a number of articles on the problem of evil in the press and blogosphere. Many were quick to point out that here again was an example of gratuitous natural evil that certainly no moral being would permit if they could prevent it. Certainly an all powerful and all knowing being could prevent such events. Yet there were many theists that were quick to toss out various theodicies in defense of theistic belief. I am rather skeptical about the task of presenting a theodicy, being more comfortable with a defense. While I have felt the tragedy of natural and moral evil in the world, I have never found the problem of evil a pressing problem. Since others have taken the task of presenting various theodicies I wanted to point out a couple of bits of metatheodicy that I have found comforting when contemplating the problem of evil.
The first point comes from Richard Swinburne who points out that many people think offering a theodicy is an impossible task because they have an extremely narrow conception of good and evil. This narrowness arises because people tend to focus on only the sensory pleasures and pains of life, a focus which is farcically narrow. To my great amusement and agreement Swinburne calls such persons moral pygmies. When one has a broader conception of good and evil the possibility of theodicy seems more promising. The difficulty lies in the fact that quantifying, qualifying, and mapping the relations between goods and evils is an enormous task.
The second point comes from Peter van Inwagen who points out that our universe provides the only model we have for designing a world. For all we know, in any world that is significantly complex the laws of nature have the same structure as our laws of nature. This means that if somebody really thinks things could have been different than they are, then they should provide some model describing in detail the laws of nature that govern that world. This model should include a story of how the universe and all its life develops, what are the boundary conditions for the operation of the natural laws, how does spacetime function, etc. Short of such a model we have little reason to think that other options in creating a world are metaphysically possible.
(Further reading: Swinburne's "Some Major Strands of Theodicy" and PvI's "The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence" in William Rowe's God and the Problem of Evil; "Ontological Arguments," Nous 11 (1977); Review of The Coherence of Theism, The Philosophical Review LXXXVII (1979))
I hope Mr. Swinburne does not think the grief and anguish that attends the death of a loved one, and the subjective assessment that such death is evil rather than good, is "too narrow." That would make pygmies of us all.
except for a stoic:
if you should kiss your child or wife,
say that you are kissing a person;
for when one dies, you will not be disturbed.
EPICTETOU ENCHEIRIDION, 3
Strange Doctrines,
Grief and anguish are not too narrow. Note that that the narrow focus would be to talk about only the sensory pain of the one who died.
I think that part of what Swinburne is addressing are examples like that of a fawn burned in a forest fire. Not to trivialize evil and suffering, but I think that it is far too easy to forget about the great amount of good in the world, and the goods that stem from responding to evils. Good is much like the train nobody notices until it doesn't arrive on time.
Hi. Isn't it true that the point regarding the structure of natural laws can only be available to theists who reject resurrection and other supernatural miracles as having occurred in fact?
- Steve
There are a number of different ways to think of miracles. Most people seem to treat them as exceptions to the laws of nature, but Plantinga has an account that treats them as God's replacements of ordinary matter with matter that doesn't have the normal properties and therefore isn't subject to the laws in the same way. Another way is to take the standard Humean view of what laws are, i.e. the simplest set of generalizations true over all time. In that case, the laws would be whatever simplest set of true generalizations matches up to reality the best. So there's no reason to assume that miracles break the laws. I don't think the Humean move helps with the problem of evil, but I'm listing it because it's another view on which miracles don't break the laws.
When we bring it back to this question, there are a number of things you might say. One thing could be simply that God doesn't want to have miracles be extremely common because then we'd be unable to predict the consequences of our actions. That doesn't require a world with no miracles. It just requires that they not be the norm. That solves your problem easily. You might add in theological reasons for not having too many miracles (related to the value of faith or whatever).
Another response might be that even with the allowance of miracles there could be some logical restriction even on how much evil miracles could prevent without robbing to the world of too much good (if you're doing a consequentialist theodicy) or without God's doing something wrong (if deontological). I'm not sure how that would go, but I wouldn't want to rule it out a priori.
Thanks, that was helpful.- steve
I have never found the problem of evil a pressing problem.
Could you, perchance, explain why?
This narrowness arises because people tend to focus on only the sensory pleasures and pains of life, a focus which is farcically narrow.
Have you ever met such a person? I haven't. Even my four year old has a richer conception of good and bad.
... if somebody really thinks things could have been different than they are, then they should provide some model describing in detail the laws of nature that govern that world. This model should include a story of how the universe and all its life develops, what are the boundary conditions for the operation of the natural laws, how does spacetime function, etc. Short of such a model we have little reason to think that other options in creating a world are metaphysically possible.
I think van Inwagen's argument is weak. For one, it depends on a hefty dose of modal skepticism. Moreover, the most it gets you is that we ought to suspend judgment on whether other worlds are metaphysically possible, and a fortiori on whether there are metaphysically possible worlds that are better than the actual world. But if that's the case, then one might reasonably conclude that we ought to suspend judgment on whether an all-powerful, morally perfect being exists, because the existence of such a being implies that there is no such metaphysically possible better world.
John Turri,
Note that I am not claiming that the PoE is not indeed a problem. I am simply claiming that it is one I don't feel is pressing. One reason I don't find it pressing because like a number of other problems it does not elicit the same sense of urgency as other problems. Due to my finite brain and finite time some problems simply have to go on the back burner. A second reason that I don't find it pressing is that I think there are some really good replies to the problem already. A third reason, and this one may be scandalous to some, is that I don't find apologetics very appealing. I suppose I could list more and tell some personal stories, but these seem sufficient reasons.
The claim is not that people have only a conception of the sensory pleasures and pains of life, but that they tend to focus on the sensory pleasures and pains of life. I have not met people that have only a conception of sensory pains and pleasures, but I have met people that tend to make that their focus.
Hmm modal skepticism from PvI… what a shock! Maybe you might make more in the way of an argument against van Inwagen's claims. PvI's modal skepticism only extends to worlds that are very different from our everyday world. It seems to me that many a proponent of the PoE is claiming that things could have been otherwise. Yet I don't feel any reason to take them seriously since the world they are asking me to believe in seems very irregular in comparison to ours. I am not claiming that such irregularities cannot be worked out, but that I don't think I need to take such claims very seriously until the working out is done.
Maybe you might make more in the way of an argument against van Inwagen's claims.
I already did. I said:
Moreover, the most it gets you is that we ought to suspend judgment on whether other worlds are metaphysically possible, and a fortiori on whether there are metaphysically possible worlds that are better than the actual world. But if that's the case, then one might reasonably conclude that we ought to suspend judgment on whether an all-powerful, morally perfect being exists, because the existence of such a being implies that there is no such metaphysically possible better world.
This is very suspicious:
Yet I don't feel any reason to take them seriously since the world they are asking me to believe in seems very irregular in comparison to ours. I am not claiming that such irregularities cannot be worked out, but that I don't think I need to take such claims very seriously until the working out is done.
I don't see why you or van Inwagen claim that the relevant changes would require or result in "massive irregularities." What's the evidence for that? How do we know that the relevant changes couldn't be brought about by moving an occasional quark around at just the right time? And how do you stop this skepticism from becoming global skepticism about all counterfactuals?
I for one would live with the occasional irregularity if it meant the end of, say, death from water-borne illnesses or starvation. What would you prefer?
Matt,
You might think that Swinburne's labeling someone a 'moral pygmy' is amusing, but I found it particularly obnoxious. It doesn't take a conception of value as narrow as Bentham or Moore's to regard the example of the fawn burned by the forest fire as a serious challenge for the traditional theist. If you have an explanation for how it could be that allowing an innocent creature to slowly burn to death is an expression of care and benevolence, I'd love to hear it. I know of no plausible non-consequentialist moral theory that allows for such a thing and the question as to whether such an omission is permitted in a consequentialist framework is one I can't imagine being seriously debated.
Moreover, if your remark "Good is much like the train nobody notices until it doesn't arrive on time" captured the core of the idea that sustained your casual indifference to the problem of animal suffering, I'm probably not the only one struck by the fact that this suggests a picture according to which we can discount the suffering of animals because it is so greatly outweighed by other goods. If theism is saved by such simple weighing explanations that discount the suffering of innocent creatures, I guess we are all moral pygmies these days, no?
I don't mean to come down to hard on you, but I honestly want to know, if the argument from animal suffering is such an obvious nonstarter, where does it go wrong?
Clayton, I keep seeing people saying that responses to the problem of evil assume consequentialism, but doesn't the Bambi example itself assume some sort of consequentialism? It just seems to me that most framings of the problem itself assume just the same sort of consequentialism as most ways the responses are framed. On deontological views, for instance, right and wrong are not determined in any way by consequences. Then why is it wrong to allow something with the consequence of great suffering? It can't be that it results in great suffering. That doesn't count as a good reason to a deontologist.
Jeremy,
Why is it wrong to allow something with the consequence of great suffering? It can't be that it results in great suffering. That doesn't count as a good reason to a deontologist.
Are you saying that an even minimally plausible deontological theory won't either include among it's rules or straightforwardly imply something like the following: Other things being equal, one ought not to cause great suffering?
Are you saying that the certain prospect of causing great suffering isn't even a pro tanto reason not to perform some action?
John,
You beat me to the punch. Jeremy, there is simply no plausible non-consequentialist theory that says to hell with the consequences. Examples. Foot in 'Utilitarianism and the Virtues' claims that consequentialism is wrong insofar as it treats benevolence as the sole virtue when in fact, true expressions of benevolence require that considerations of justice, fidelity etc. are factored in. Surely it would be a gross misrepresentation of her view to say that she doesn't regard benevolence as one virtue amongst many. The benevolent person will on some occassions act as the consequentialist does. The difference arises when, say, considerations of justice come into play, which presumably they don't in the case of the deer, cases of unattended infants falling into pools, etc.. Thomson is a non-consequentialist and thinks that if doing something would be good in some way but would not be unjust or miserly it ought to be done and so again would regard the prospect of great pain and suffering a sufficient motive given the context for saving the deer. Ross is a non-consequentialist and again he recognized a pro tanto duty that becomes your duty proper to act in ways to prevent terrible consequences from coming about when not outweighed by other pro tanto duties. Take the doctrine of double effect. It grants permissions to allow someone to act in ways that produce bad effects as consequences but only does so when that bad effect is not as bad as the alternatives. Yes, DDE has a requirement on intention for permissibility in virtue of which it counts as a non-consequentialist principle, but it has an additional consequentialist element and does nothing like license complete indifference to suffering.
Being a non-consequentialist means that you are willing to treat more than the consequences as a determinate of right action. Being a non-consequentialist is not a matter of holding the ludicrous position that consequences never matter or that non-consequential considerations are always in play in such a way that prevent us from preventing the bad from happening.
Any ignorance on my part of contemporary ethical theory is a function of learning normative ethics from introductory texts as I've had to teach the subject, so if there's more on this that I don't get please fill me in.
I'm aware that on non-consequentialist views many actions that have bad consequences come out wrong, but it doesn't seem to me that they're wrong because they have bad consequences. Kant in particular was horrified at the use of good and bad consequences to determine which actions someone should do, because that involves using people as a means to an end. I know not every case of caring about consequences is like that, but it means consequences alone can't be a reason for the moral status of an action.
Also, consequences aren't the justification for why benevolence is good in virtue ethics or why we should prevent suffering with deontology. It's not the consequences that make benevolence good for a virtue ethicist. It's that it's a good character trait, and somehow that's not supposed to be reducible to some fact about the consequences. If it's reducible to anything, it has to do with some fuzzy notion of what it is to be a good human being, but this of course is the problem with virtue ethics (and really a Euthyphoro-like meta-ethical problem that I've never seen any view really deal with).
With Kant, I can easily figure out why it's wrong for us to be cruel to each other. It's got to do with not being able to universalize that. I don't know how you're going to universalize when you put animals and God into the picture, though. The whole business goes out the window on Kant's own view, because God has no obligations for Kant, and animals have no moral worth anyway. Even if he didn't say those things, as I assume most Kantians today don't, I still don't know how you're going to begin thinking about God universalizing in a way that would treat humans, deer, slugs, angels, and God all alike, which is what universalizing requires. When I have some sense of how that's supposed to go, maybe I can figure out how the problem of evil is supposed to arise, but I'm at a complete loss at this point.
Jeremy,
You asked:
I'm aware that on non-consequentialist views many actions that have bad consequences come out wrong, but it doesn't seem to me that they're wrong because they have bad consequences
It is hard to say what the truth-conditions for statements like 'That was wrong because it resulted in horrific consequences' are. It does not seem to me that asserting something like this logically precludes facts other than facts about consequences mattering. A defender of NC may say that it is the absence of further morally relevant features conjoined with facts about the consequences that figure together in a very long explanation about why you oughtn't refrain from saving a deer. A defender of C may say that the absence or presence doesn't matter. It seems they can both say, consistent with their theories, that X is obligatory/permissible/forbidden because of the consequences for the same sorts of reasons that I can say both that the glass broke because it was fragile and the glass broke because it was struck.
If this is right, then the virtue ethicist, the Rossian, Thomson, and the consequentialists can all say without incurring much by way of theoretical commitment that anyone in a position to save that deer ought to have done so given the consequences.
Kant does say quite a few unfortunate things about the significance of suffering, among them, remarks about the impossibility of direct obligations or duties to refrain from harming animals. As far as I can tell, his strongest argument for thinking that pain and suffering are of no moral value are based on his examples of the pleasures of the wicked which to me suggest nothing more than the claim that when pain is not fitting, it is bad whereas he seems to draw the stronger claim that pain can have value only instrumentally. Contemporary Kantians, in my opinion, should not hold that animal pain is of no moral significance whatsoever for the same reason that they should care about the pains of the biologically human at the margins of development or death.
You remark:
I don't know how you're going to universalize when you put animals and God into the picture, though. The whole business goes out the window on Kant's own view, because God has no obligations for Kant ... Even if he didn't say those things, as I assume most Kantians today don't, I still don't know how you're going to begin thinking about God universalizing in a way that would treat humans, deer, slugs, angels, and God all alike, which is what universalizing requires.
There are a few things here. I don't know why Kant thinks that God doesn't have any obligations. It seems a very weird thing for him to think since he is explicit that he thinks rational beings as such have obligations. There are contexts in which it is clear that he does not regard 'rational being' as picking out just the biologically human because he distinguishes between the duties had by rational dependent beings (humans) and those that are rational but not dependent beings (angels).
I don't understand the last bit about universalization and the treatment of deer, slugs, etc. I don't see why Kant can't recognize the distinction between equality of consideration and treatment. In some sense, Kant himself would recognize that we should consider slugs, deer, people, angels, and God equally--we ask whether they are rational beings or not and go from there. We have duties to people we do not to angels because of the differences in their needs and to treat them equally in spite of this would be a violation of equality of consideration. If the worry was something like Kant would be committed to the less than sane view that we treat slugs like we treat each other, I think we can save him from it. But it may be that your last point was getting at something altogether.
The reason Kant didn't think God has obligations is because you have to be able to fail in an obligation for it to make sense that you have them. He saw obligations as requiring a potential moral deficiency. Alston takes the same view with respect to beliefs. God doesn't have them because there's no fact God can't know. He sees beliefs as requiring a potential epistemological deficiency.
I'll have to think about the rest of this when I've less distraction.
You might be interested in this website and companion book:"Putting God on Trial: The Biblical Book of Job" (Trafford, Victoria, 2004)(http://www.bookofjob.org) The entire commentary is online.
The book was highly praised by leading Job scholars: Clines, Habel, Janzen and by the Review of Biblical Literature. The entire commentary is online.
It was written by a Anglican Canadian criminal defense lawyer who argues the Book of Job presents a Hegelian theodicy, where God is causally responsible for the undeserved evil that befalls Job (and by implication us), but not morally blameworthy for it. Such undeserved evil is morally necessary to bring the existence of God as a God of goodness into doubt and sever any necessary connection between righteousness and reward. Only in such a world is the existence of a truely selfless love of men and women for God possible.
Robert Sutherland