Suppose you agree with Tom Morris that the doctrine of the Incarnation requires that there be no conflict in the essential properties of divinity and the essential properties of (full) humanity. Mere humans might have essential properties that a fully human person might not have, such as transworld depravity, but a fully human being is not barred in principle from also being divine.
If this is true, consider the knowability paradox, according to which it follows from the claim that all truths are knowable that all truths are known. The proof relies on two principles about knowledge that I won't defend here: that knowledge implies truth, and that knowledge distributes across conjunctions.
The proof is simple. Let K = it is known by some human at some time that. Then assume that some unknown truth is known: K(p & ~Kp). Distribute the K operator to get Kp & K~Kp, and then use the fact that knowledge implies truth to drop the K operator from the second conjunct, thus deriving: Kp & ~Kp. So by RAA, we get ~K(p&~Kp). Since this result is a theorem, by the rule of necessitation, it is necessary: []~K(p&~Kp). By the interdefinability rules for necessity and possibility, this claim implies that knowledge of an unknown truth is impossible: ~<>K(p&~Kp).
Now, if we assume that all truths are knowable, and since p & ~Kp is an arbitrarily chosen value for an unknown truth, it follows that the truth that p is an unknown truth is itself knowable, i.e., <>K(p&~Kp). Since this conclusion contradicts that of the last paragraph, we should conclude that it is false that all truths are knowable.
Now for the bite...
