Belief and Divine Hiddenness

Ted,

I think the question you're raising is a good one.

What kind of belief is necessary for having a personal relationship with someone?

I agree that credence 1 is not necessary. But, what about cases in which a person's evidnce suggests that the probability that God exists is less than .5. Is it possible for that person to have a personal relationship? I take it the reason we are discussing belief, and not some other attitude, is that we accept belief is required to form certain intentions, intentions that motivate us to act in certain ways that is constitutive of having a personal relationship. So, belief is necessary because the intentions are. The question then is whether we can have these intentions, whatever they are, absent belief of at least .5 credence. To make headway, I think, we would have to characterize "personal relationship" and argue that certain intentions are necessary for it.

Perhaps belief just isn't necessary at all. Perhaps desire without belief is sufficient to have a personal relationship, the right kind of desire. And what about imagination without belief. Can one imagine God in a certain way, be agnostic to his existence, and want to be with God and count as personally related to God (if God exists)? If imagination and desire is enough, then Shellenburg's argument will need additional premises. He will need to qualify personal relationship in such a way that imagination and desire isn't enough and I take it that would weaken it's strength.

Christian,

Thanks for the helpful comments.

I�m not sure about the distinction between belief and intention. It seems to me that an intention is a kind of belief or a kind of belief coupled with a certain desire. For example if Jones has the intention to help Smith out Jones believes that Smith is in need and is moved to help him.

I like your suggestion that belief (whether de re or de dicto) may not be necessary at all for a personal relationship with God. I tend to think that some benefits of such a relationship supervene on a person�s desires rather than a person�s beliefs. But it does seem that some belief is necessary for a hope that p or a wish that p. I can�t hope that p if my credence for p is 0. I, at least, have to think it�s possible that p in order to hope or wish that p. So if God is under an obligation to give sufficient evidence of his existence to all willing and able persons, I�d expect all willing and able persons to have some positive credence (however low) for the claim �There is a God.� And it seems that that is the case�after all there�s no hidden contradiction in the claim �There is a God�.

About the conditions for a personal relationship, it seems to me that a person can be in a personal relationship with another even though that person has an extremely low credence that the other person exists. For example, suppose I am putting out milk and rice for a neighborhood stray cat. Every day I do this and every day the milk and rice are eaten. Now it turns out that I�m not feeding a stray cat, but a homeless person (completely unbeknownst to me). I tend to think that I have a personal relationship with this person even though I don�t believe (de dicto) at all that I am feeding a person. To generalize a bit�it�s this sort of kindness that would reflect one a person�s character. Jesus says something like this in Mark 9:37 �Whoever welcomes one of these little children in my name welcomes me; and whoever welcomes me does not welcome me but the one who sent me.� I think it�s interesting that given this principle a person can welcome the one who sent Jesus without even thinking that that person exists.

Yes, Jesus is saying that belief isn't necessary!

And I think we can hope for p even though our credence for p is zero - world peace springs to mind. This is a non-trivial case, I think. Two peace activists might behave in identical ways, yet one might believe in the possibility of world peace, the other only in the ability of humans to act in ways which reduce conflict substantially from its present level.

Also, a mystic might well say that they have no belief in God because they have direct experience!

I am also a bit confused about what you mean by a "personal relationship" - I think your example is a bit loaded... if I have a losing lottery ticket do I have a "personal relationship" with the winner because part of their winnings came from my stake? Clearly I don't have an inter-personal relationship in that case (or in yours). Can I have an inter-personal relationship with God in the same sense that I can with you? And if so, how would either of us tell whether or not I was sane?

As ever, I am not at all sure that what can be said about God can be "reduced" to what can be said about not-God.

Even if we end up thinking that belief that p exists isn't necessary to have a personal relationship with p, we might still think that belief that p exists is necessary to a have a fulfilling relationship with p. I say fulfilling because, it seems, that doubt about p's existence makes the relationship less satisfactory. If I doubt that I am communicating with p, I doubt that my message is getting across and feel less inclined to send it. If I doubt that p exists, I doubt that p cares about me, has intentions towards me, and part of what makes a relationship fulfilling is the belief that I am cared for by p, the phenomenology associated with the belief is what makes the relationship, in part, valuable to have. So, perhaps Shellenburg can add in this condition to make the argument more plausible, that a fulfilling personal relationship is much more valuable than a mere personal relationship and that if God exists, then God would make this kind of relationship more accessible.

A seductive but slippery argument. One might go on to say that the more statements I believe about p, the more fulfilling my relationship with p. (Conservative Christians, I think, do want to say this.) But, accepting for the moment the argument that personal relationships are reducible to (or at least are modelled on) inter-personal relationships, I am not sure that human experience backs up the logical move. What is unknown or dimly apprehended may be attractive just because of that - a strain harped on by mystics through the ages...

Christian,

Two thoughts about your proposed move�that Schellenberg should stress a fulfilling relationship with God which requires belief. I do think that this would be a plausible reply to our argument, but I don�t think it will work. First, supposing God would want a fulfilling relationship with us and so need to provide evidence that would rid us of doubt; it does not follow that he need to do so now. Perhaps there are some goods that cannot be realized without some epistemic distance from God; perhaps the goods of character-formation require some epistemic distance. Also the traditional claim is that God will give us evidence to remove doubt but this is in the future. Second, Schellenberg would need to show why God would value that kind of relationship. It�s not obvious to me that given the traditional conception of God he would value this kind of relationship. Is it really the case that God wants to �walk with me and talk with me along life�s merry way�? From the little I know about the patristics this sort of divine-human relationship model is pretty much absent.

Innocent,

The term �personal relationship� is Schellenberg�s and I doubt a correct analysis of it can be given. My cases are designed to show that you can have a personal relationship or, at least, the benefits of interacting with another person without all out de dicto belief that the person exists or just de re belief. If you narrow the kind of relationship then the hiddenness argument runs into the sorts of troubles I mention in my reply to Christian.

Ted,

I think I agree with the points you are making. I don't think it follows from the claim that God exists, that God will give us evidence that he exists which is necessary for us to have a fulfilling personal relationship with him "now". Like you say, there might be good reasons not to do so "now". But, Shellenburg should just say that there must be some time such that God gives us this evidence and this doesn't happen. People live and die without ever acquiring this evidence and miss out on this fulfilling relationship through no fault of their own. Second, Shellenburg would need to argue for the claim that a fulfilling relaionship is more valuable than a merely personal relationship such that if God exists, then God would give the evidence necessary for it. But, it is plausible? That is, all else equal, a relationship with the relevant belief is better than the one without, especially if the belief causes good feelings in the believer. Feelings of comfort, trust and love.

It seems the big question is whether or not there is some good that requires God to permit people not to have a fulfilling personal relationship. If God is perfect, there is, but if there appears to be none, then it is reasonable to believe there is none and that God is not perfect. Of course, it is an open question as to whether or not the fact there appears to be no good reason is a good reason to think there is no good reason.

Christian,

�But, Shellenburg should just say that there must be some time such that God gives us this evidence and this doesn't happen. People live and die without ever acquiring this evidence and miss out on this fulfilling relationship through no fault of their own.�
Yes, but there�s more than this life. Aquinas and some Thomists have some interesting things to say about what happens at the �moment of death� which are worth pursuing if you are interested. Also, for the Catholic at least, there is the prospect of Purgatory of some sort for the people you mention to pass through. Their journey can continue in some way. So S. really has to argue for a very strong claim indeed: There exist people such that at no time do they have adequate evidence for a fulfilling personal relationship with God. That would constitute a really good objection to theism, but I don�t know how you�d go about supporting such a proposition. I think S.�s lack of diachronic perspective is one of his biggest oversights.

Trent,

Maybe this will be obvious, but here it is anyway. I think your right in suggesting that "moment of death" experiences can function as times at which God could make himself evident. The time in purgatory can also function as a time at which God can make himself evident. So, if we include these times, then S would have to make a strong claim. But...

We shouldn't include these times. I take it we want a response to S's argument that even an agnostic can accept, and an agnostic can't accept the existence of purgatory or "moment of death" experiences in which God gives a certain kind of evidence. Secondly, if having a personal relationship with God prior to death is a necessary condition for not going to purgatory, then that way is out (some christians believe this anyway, so we need a reason to include one doctrine and exclude the other, a possible weakness of this defense). Lastly, I take it that even accepting God at the moment of death is not sufficient to have a fulfilling personal relationship with God. One moment of acknowledgement falls short of a sufficient condition for a fulfilling relationship. Now, if we are considering post death times, then the argument is wide open. But this defense (it seems) is pretty weak. I mean we all can acknowledge that it is possible that we survive death and god gives us a certain kind of evidence, but what bearing does this possibility have on whether or not it is reasonable to believe that we don't have the evidence and that if God exists, then he would give it to us. And again, we can only go this way if we thought we survived death, and this weakens the strength of this defense by adding assumptions the agnostic about survival of death can't accept.

Does that sound right?

Oh, you do want go on to say that the more statements I believe about p, the more fulfilling my relationship with p!

Christian,

The agnostic should be open to the theoretical role an afterlife plays in theism. Trent and I argue that S�s argument fails because belief (as qualified above) is not necessary for a personal relationship with God. The reply is that it is necessary for a fulfilling relationship with God. At this point in the dialectic it becomes imperative to think about the theoretical resources of theism. Perhaps God best achieves all his goals for us now�character formation and some sense of a personal relationship with him�by putting some epistemic distance between him and us. We think a fulfilling personal relationship is a good and that it requires belief that God exists. But traditional theism explains when this fulfilling personal relationship will obtain, viz., much later. In so far as S�s argument is an argument against theism I don�t see why the agnostic should resist an appeal to the afterlife. It does not function as an added assumption but as an integral part of the theistic hypothesis.

IA,

Yeah, the more beliefs about P, the more fulfilling the relationship can be. Of course, they have to be the right beliefs, my belief that P is cheating on me won't make the relationship more fulfilling. So, take those facts that make a relationship more fulfilling, believing those facts obtain in your own relationship will make the relationship more fulfilling, all else equal. (I'm sure there are funny counterexamples to this, but whatever.)

Ted & Trent,

I'm not exactly sure how to respond. But, I'm an agnostic. For me, your defense won't help because you use a premise like "If there is an afterlife, then there are times at which God will make himself evident". I could agree with this, I think Christians should, but it doesn't help much with the case against Shellenburg for an agnostic.

I think Shellenburg has some premise P which is suppose to be true (probability 1)

You response (simplifying) is that If q, then not-p.

An agnostic with respect to q gives q probability .5 and can accept probability 1 to if q, then not-p.

With only this, the probability that p is .75 and Shellenburg has shown enough, that it is reasonable to believe God does not exist.

I hope my math is not bad. I guess I just think your defense only does work for someone who is already a theist.

Christian,

More later since I�m in class, but I just wanted to point out that there�s a difference between defending one�s beliefs and trying to convince others. If I were trying to convince you of something, I may want to restrict what I appeal to, although�as Ted points out�one consideration is the theoretical resources of theism.

When you say �I guess I just think your defense only does work for someone who is already a theist� you ironically restate my whole point, but from your own point of view. My point was that S�s argument only works if you�re already an atheist! My *defense* of theism may appeal to the resources of theism.

Christian,

A few more things.

1. I take it that your P is supposed to be: There is non-culpable unbelief. I do think that even granting the certainty of this for argument�s sake, the argument fails. But I�m personally not too close to certain on that. In fact, I�m pretty close to agnostic on that. The upshot is that my posteriors are going to be quite different from yours. I say this in part to let you know that as far as Ted and I are concerned the main use of subjective probabilities are to help one achieve egocentric rationality. Neither of us are arguing that agnostics can�t be egocentrically rational (at this point). What we are saying in this context�among other things�is that S has not brought up anything that is a threat to a mature theist�s egocentric rationality.

2. Not the �among other things� above. We laid out three independent lines of response. The diachronic point was only one. So our cumulative response depends on the *disjunction* of the lines of reasoning, not their *conjunction*. So even if our last point was a wash�not that we think it is from the standpoint of this discussion�the two other lines of response�the de dicto/de re distinction and the full belief/degree of belief distinction�still stand.

3. Finally, here�s why the use of the afterlife is definitely admissible here. S�s argument appeals to a premise like this: *If* God existed, then He�d do such and such, give certain sorts of evidence to certain sorts of people. I.e. [](H --> X). We are simply replying that >(H & ~X). This is because >(H --> Y) where Y --> ~X and Y is some good greater than X (not sure I even need the last clause). Since S�s *objection* is framed in terms of a God hypothesis, our *response* can do so as well. I don�t assume there *is* an afterlife, we assume that *if* there is a God, he *could* permissibly wait until the afterlife to provide full evidence (or grant full benefits based on de dicto or partial belief).

Guys,

I wasn't really trying to be ironic. Anyway, you say:

"My point was that S�s argument only works if you�re already an atheist!"

Not really, right? I take it there is no premise in Shellenburg's argument that an agnostic couldn't endorse (If there is, I take this back). But, in your defense, there are premises an agnostic couldn't endorse, premises about the afterlife.

You say:

"What we are saying in this context�among other things�is that S has not brought up anything that is a threat to a mature theist�s egocentric rationality." I guess that seems right to me.

And finally,

"Since S�s *objection* is framed in terms of a God hypothesis, our *response* can do so as well."

Yeah, but I take it Shellenburg is only relying on inferences about what the existence of a morally perfect being entails that are plausible. But, your hypothesis includes facts not only about what a morally perfect being might do, but also facts about survival of death and maybe purgatory. So, your 'Y' is not something that follows all by itself from the claim that God exists, but Shellenburgs claim that there is non-culpable disbelief is suppose to entail that God is not morally perfect.

And I think your right about making the defense disjunctive rather than conjunctive. By the way, Shellenburg is presenting at my school next week on this stuff, I appreciate that you got me thinking about it beforehand.

Christian, in response to your question, in response to Ted, regarding cases in which evidence suggests that the probability that God exists is less than .5. Is it possible for that person to have a personal relationship?

If you concede that Ted could have a personal relationship with only .5 belief in the existence of the person with whom he communicated, then I don't see why you would find it problematic to dip below the .5 mark. Consider this example:

Young Susie believes her father passed away when she was a child. Her father is, in fact, still alive and, ironically, drives her school bus each day under an assumed name. Each day she sits in front of the bus and makes small talk with him. And each evening, she goes to her father's grave with roses, mourning his death.

She has an infintecimally low (zero?) belief that her father is alive and great evidence (her mother's stories, his tombstone, etc.) that he is dead. Why do you draw a critical threshhold at .5 when the relationship itself (e.g. the conversation on the bus, the tapping on the cell) would consist in no notably less "relating" at a lower degree of belief? Do you want to say that all de re relationships are not really "personal relationships"? If so, then under traditional theology's terms, you'll have to say that we can never come to have a relationship with God. Consider the account given by Aquinas in Summa Contra Gentiles here he suggests we can only come do have a de re knowledge of God (we can know him as "the unknown," or God without any religious qualities. That God is not hidden, and we can relate with him. God with qualities is, for Aquinas, hidden - about as hidden as the color of the gloves on the hands of the tapping man in the faraway jail cell.

Or, to make things easier, just scoot Ted's tapping buddy a few cells down and add the condition that Ted knows that that there's only a .25 chance that the cell is occupied.

Oh, I just want to say belief isn't necessary.
I was taking it that any credence below .5 would count as disbelief, that is belief that God does not exist. It isn't as clear to me that someone can have a personal relationship with God if they believe God does not exist.

One thing that occurred to me that might have relevance here is whether propositional content is required (and if so what content). Does a personal relationship require some propositional content? Does de re belief require some propositional content? I don't know, but if the answer is yes then it has some relevance for some of the claims here, I think. After all, saying that de dicto belief isn't necessary but just de re belief may be fine, but if that de re belief requires some propositional content then doesn't the argument loom its ugly head again? the same goes for having a personal relationship. If propositional content is required, and that propositional content isn't available to everyone, then the skeptic will say that there isn't enough evidence for that content. I suppose the degree of assent to that content might play a role still, but I'm not sure what you'd say here. Maybe you'd just deny that there's propositional content, but all the examples above seem to require some true propositional content in attitudes toward the person.

Jeremy,
You raise a good question for our response to S�s argument. Thanks for that! I�ll have to think more about this but my initial response is as follows.
If belief is understood along the lines of endorsing a content then to have a de re belief in God one would have to endorse a content that implies an acceptance of God. We don�t want to say that that content implies there is a God, where the implication is relevance implication, not material implication. So the content of one�s belief needn�t be there is an all-mighty, all-knowing, etc., being. One type of case we have in mind for de re belief in God is where one intentionally acts for the good and against the bad. In this kind of case persons choose the good and try to further the good because it is good�they endorse the content �x is good and should be furthered�. For the purposes of our paper we argue that this endorsement implies a de re belief in God. (Roughly the idea is that God will count service towards the good as service towards himself.) Of course, this has the unintuitive result that many people turn out to have de re belief in God! But if our argument is to work, many people must have evidence sufficient for a personal relationship with God.

Well, that's an interesting way to support Calvin's view that everyone really knows God exists but just suppresses it. Assuming an externalist account of knowledge and assuming de re belief of this sort involves genuine connection with God, which is all that counts on most reliabilist views, we then have de re knowledge of God without necessarily having any de dicto beliefs about God or even alongside de dicto beliefs that there is no God! I don't think this is going to be a popular idea, but it intrigues me at least.

I would like to make a comment on this most interesting discussion on divine hiddenness.

It seems that some of you, particularly Ted (Poston), are missing the crux of Schellenberg's view. One can, of course, have some kind of relationship with God without even being aware of it. For as Ted puts it, "God will count service towards the good as service towards himself" (think also of Rahner's notion of 'anonymous Christians'). So, an atheist or agnostic who leads a virtuous life may enjoy some kind of relationship with God despite not having any explicit belief in God. But Schellenberg's point, as I read him, is that if there were a perfectly loving God, he would want to have the kind of relationship with each of us that mature adults have with each other when they are in love - that is to say, a relationship in which each partner is fully aware of the loving presence of the other and reciprocates that love. That kind of relationship clearly requires much more than a dim or faint awareness of the existence of the other person, let alone no awareness at all of the other.

Thanks for your comment; glad you found the discussing engaging.
I agree that that�s the kind of personal relationship Schellenberg has in mind and agree that that sort of relationship requires more than faint awareness of the other. In the discussion above we referred to it as a �fulfilling personal relationship� (see my comments in response to Christian on October 11th and the resulting discussion). The main burden of our argument is that a significant personal relationship with God is available on the current evidence�for not every personal relationship requires all out de dicto belief. Of course this is not the kind of relationship Schellenberg has in mind, but this kind of relationship (the one that doesn�t require all out de dicto belief) carries with it many goods. Given that result, it strengthens a greater good response to the hiddenness argument. As I said above, �Perhaps there are some goods that cannot be realized without some epistemic distance from God; perhaps the goods of character-formation require some epistemic distance.�

Hi Ted,

Thanks for your reply. I guess you're drawing a distinction between (a) having a fulfilling personal relationship with God and (b) having a significant personal relationship with God. And your view is that (a), but not (b), requires all out de dicto belief. Furthermore, you say, there is sufficient evidence around for people to engage in (b)-type relationships.

Let's say, for the sake of argument, that you're right about all this (personally, I'm not at all sure that you are). Schellenberg's case would remain intact, since his point is that if there were a loving God, such a God would not settle for anything less than (a)-type relationships. Perhaps at this stage you would introduce the 'epistemic distance defence' to explain why (a)-type relationships are not more common. In my view, however, Schellenberg has developed a very strong case against such a defence.

But let's assume, for the sake of argument again, that the appeal to epistemic distance is no good. How else could you account for divine hiddenness, where divine hiddenness in this context just refers to the fact that not everyone forms an (a)-type relationship with God? I think this fact is very difficult for the theist to adequately explain, particularly if epistemic distance can be shown to be unnecessary.

Nick,

If our point holds about the role of belief in different kinds of personal relationships, then the claim �if there were a loving God, such a God would not settle for anything less than (a)-type relationships� needs further argument. For we claim that (b)-type divine-human relationships realize many goods that God is expected to bring about viz., the possibility of salvation and moral/spiritual growth. The epistemic distance defense comes into play (as you note) to explain why God would not bring about an (a)-type relationship *now*. I don�t think Schellenberg�s arguments against this kind of defense are crippling. But further given our main point it seems to me that the epistemic distance defense is strengthened b/c God doesn�t need to bring about (a)-type relationships *now* to realize many of the goods he is expected to bring about.

About our overall argument, we do depend on the epistemic distance defense but I think that the discussion of different kinds of personal relationships changes the overall dialectical structure so that E-D defense is more plausible.

I�ll focus on the following point you make:

�We claim that (b)-type divine-human relationships realize many goods that God is expected to bring about viz., the possibility of salvation and moral/spiritual growth.�

Recall, a (b)-type relationship is one in which a human person is related to God by dint of leading a virtuous way of life, even though that person does not explicitly accept the existence of God. Examples of such people might include devout Buddhists and virtuous atheists.

Now, the following thesis seems to be eminently plausible:

Other things being equal, someone who is consciously aware of the existence and presence of God has greater opportunities for developing morally and (especially) spiritually than someone who has no such conscious awareness.

Call this thesis, (T). Now, if you accept (T), then it would seem highly unlikely that God would settle for anything less than an (a)-type relationship. This, I think, is the point Schellenberg was trying to make.

I suppose you would reject the claim made in (T) � is that right? I think, however, that even if you reject (T), you�re still left with some important problems. Allow me to explain.

Wouldn�t you agree that a conscious personal relationship with God is usually thought to have enormous benefits that could not be obtained (at least very easily) in any other way? What benefits, you might say? Well, here are two such benefits: (i) acquiring true beliefs regarding the nature of ultimate reality, and (ii) acquiring a conscious awareness of the unconditional love of God, which awareness provides one with a deep sense of happiness, security, and peace of mind, because this (and only this) awareness affords one with the knowledge that the world is under the providential control of a perfectly loving being.

Now, these �fruits� that proceed from a conscious personal relationship with God are not only intrinsically valuable, but they also help foster one�s moral and spiritual development. The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that an explicit personal relationship with God is at least very valuable for the moral and spiritual life.

Now, you might reply: If the goods of salvation and moral/spiritual growth can be obtained merely through (b)-type relationships, then why should God bother about encouraging (a)-type relationships? The answer, I think, is clear: A perfectly loving God would provide us with as many resources as possible for aiding our salvation and moral/spiritual growth. In other words, a perfectly loving God would provide us with everything that he could possibly provide us in order that we may grow morally/spiritually and be saved. And one of things that it is surely possible for God to provide us, in order that we may grow morally/spiritually, is (a)-type relationships. So, even if you reject thesis (T), you�re still in trouble.

A couple comments about thesis (T)��Other things being equal, someone who is consciously aware of the existence and presence of God has greater opportunities for developing morally and (especially) spiritually than someone who has no such conscious awareness.�

I don�t find this principle rationally compelling. Here�s why.
(A) It seems to me that to become a virtuous person, not just a person that performs right acts, one must act on the basis of internal authority. If an external authority always leads me to perform the right act, then�intuitively�I don�t think I�m virtuous. Here�s a case that may help make this point: If my mother follows me around all the time I�ll definitely perform more right acts than otherwise, but I won�t be a better person. Similarly, it seems to me that if God�s presence is evident then I�ll perform good acts but I won�t be a better person.
(B) I think the belief-that / belief-in distinction is relevant. God may be able to make everyone belief that he exists, but he can�t make everyone trust him. Genuine spiritual development requires trust in God. Given my earlier points about (b)-type relationships, I think that a person can belief-in God without full-fledged belief-that God exists. But if that�s possible then spiritual growth is possible without complete belief that God exists. Perhaps a similar point to Kierkegaard�s claim about passionate faith holds here: trust in God apart from complete belief that he exists is extremely valuable.
(C) With greater knowledge comes greater responsibility. If God made it evident that he existed to everyone at all times then a greater evil would be possible: willful scorn of a good God. This seems to support the further claim that new kinds of moral and spiritual evils could be realized if God made evident his existence.
(D) I don�t want to deny that there are goods of clarity if God�s existence were evident. But I also think that there are goods of mystery, goods that are more likely to be realized if God�s existence is not evident to everyone at all times (the goods of clarity/goods of mystery distinction comes from Robert McKim. He has an excellent review of Schellenberg�s book in F&P 12:2 1995.). All our argument needs is that one should suspend judgment about (T) and this because one should suspend judgment about whether the goods of clarity outweigh the goods of mystery. If a case could be made that the goods of clarity outweigh the goods of mystery within the context of our argument about different kinds of personal relationships then our argument would be in trouble. But apart from such an argument (and it seems like a very difficult task) Schellenberg�s premise (2) does not command ascent.

In relation to your point (A):

Swinburne (following Kant) makes the same point you make here, but I find it unpersuasive. If the existence of God were to strike me as obviously true, would I instantly and invariably do that which is right? Doesn�t it seem strange to think that a knowledge of God instantly affords one with a knowledge of what is (genuinely) right and wrong? Consider the fact that people have committed all sorts of atrocities even though they had little doubt that there is a God (Osama bin Laden quickly comes to mind). Perhaps such people have a skewed conception of God. But that just reinforces my point: people can have direct and continuous experience of God, but still have the freedom to rationalize their bad intentions by saying such things as �This [an evil act] is the will of God�.

But let�s assume, for the sake or argument, that your right in saying that �if God�s presence is evident then I�ll perform good acts but I won�t be a better person�. I think it�s important here to spell out what exactly we mean when we say �God�s presence or existence is evident to this person�. For there is an important possibility here that is overlooked by many philosophers who discuss the topic of divine hiddenness: God could make it evident to us that he exists, not by providing us with a direct experiential awareness of his presence, but rather by implanting the belief �God exists� in us as an innate belief (on a par with such beliefs as �2 + 2 = 4� and �If something is red then it is coloured�). Now, suppose that we are all sure that God exists simply because the belief that God exists is an innate belief we all find ourselves with. In such a world we would not necessarily find ourselves experiencing God�s presence at every moment; consequently, we would not feel that God is always looking over our shoulder and hence we would not feel coerced to always do that which is right.

In relation to your point (B):

What do you mean by �spiritual growth�, as opposed to �moral growth�? I would have thought that, at least for the theist, spiritual growth presupposes an explicit commitment to God (i.e., a belief in, or trust in, God), where such a commitment itself presupposes an explicit belief that God exists.

Gosh, there's a lot to wade through. A quick word on epistemic distance, since the point seems entirely relevant. It is not true that the distance we (at least seem to) have from God is one that cannot be bridged. Mystics of the caliber and gravitas of St. John of the Cross have been much closer (and so have many, many others). So the question for theists is not why God keeps his distance from all of us. It is rather why we don't have more people coming to know God in an intimate way. Why is that? I, for one, can't name one person (among those I know) that has so much as sought such a relationship with God. Most people--again this is entirely from the numbers of people I know, but I'm prepared to wager that it is representative--want not much more than a casual acquaintance. Perhaps they don't want anything to be asked of them. Perhaps they have enough to do. In any case what I'm suggesting is that the answer to Schellenberg might well begin with the sort of relationship people are seeking rather than the kind of relationship that God is seeking.

Nick,

Thanks for the good comments.
About your first point I didn�t intend to claim that if the existence of God were evident then people would instantly and invariably do the right. Rather the claim (and with some revision) is that if God�s existence is evident there would be a significant external motivation to perform what is believed to be the right action. This external motivation undermines significant opportunities for character development. I find it plausible that virtue requires cultivating internal authority and this requires a certain distance from external authority.
You mention two interesting points: one, people can be aware of God but still perform wrong acts; and two, awareness of God may be achieved through an innate belief and this does not undermine the distance necessary for cultivating internal authority. About the first point, I think this is possible but it is also an evil. So this would be one of the bad effects of clarity. Also this doesn�t show that character development is hindered. About the second point, I�m not sure that this doesn�t undermine the distance necessary for cultivating internal authority. Suppose a future oppressive society implants in everyone a device to give them the belief that big brother is watching. It seems to me that that belief will tend to cause people to refrain from performing certain actions. Similarly an innate belief in God�and not such a vague awareness of God�would cause people to perform actions that they otherwise would not perform. In short they would perform certain acts for fear of reprisal rather than for the intrinsic merits of the acts.

About your last comment, I don�t think spiritual growth requires explicit belief that God exists, though it does presuppose a commitment to God. The rough idea is that one can trust in God by performing spiritual acts�e.g., submitting to the authority of the church, sacrificially giving to the poor, etc. I think these sorts of things can be done with less than complete confidence that God exists and perhaps even absent such belief. (Think of a person that submits themselves to the way the world ought to be.) I may very well be wrong about this but some spiritual growth is achieved by becoming more reality-centered than self-centered.

Mike,
I�m not certain I understand your response. Two quick comments though. First, the point about epistemic distance is not that it cannot be bridged. Rather the point is that non-culpable non-belief exists. Perhaps some people achieve an intimate knowledge of God but that doesn�t imply that there�s no epistemic distance. Second, if I�m on the right track I think you�re suggesting that people are culpable for their non-belief because they haven�t sought the right sort of relationship with God. This strikes a lot of people as just wrong. See, for example, Schellenberg�s article in the most recent Faith and Philosophy.

"Second, if I�m on the right track I think you�re suggesting that people are culpable for their non-belief because they haven�t sought the right sort of relationship with God. This strikes a lot of people as just wrong."

If this passage quantifies universally over people, then I can see why it might not be well-received. But I made no such claim. I said only that no theist I know has sought such a relationship and that I would wager that this group (that I know) is representative. Obviously, that is a long way from saying no one has sought such a relationship.

Ted,

I noted that people can be aware of God�s existence and still perform wrong acts. Now, you regard this as �an evil of clarity�. But that can�t be right. To begin with, what exactly is the evil in this case? Is it the mere performance of a wrong action? Or is it the performance of a wrong action, in spite of knowing that there is a God? I guess you would opt for the latter reading, but I can�t see any difference between the two. In other words, I can�t see why the disvalue of [doing something wrong] should be any less than the disvalue of [doing something wrong + knowing that God exists]. Adding the knowledge of God into the picture seems to make no difference to the �ugliness of the picture�. Perhaps your idea is that those who act wrongly despite knowing that there is a God are in some way rebelling against God or ignoring God�s commands. But those who act wrongly and aren�t aware of God are guilty of the same offence.

So, let�s say that the �evil of clarity� is the performance of some wrong action. But why is this an evil of clarity? It is not clarity that has brought about, or even made possible, the evil in question. Rather, the evil of doing that which is wrong has been brought about � or has at least been made possible � by the agent�s possession of free will. Thus, it is misleading to classify the wrong action as an �evil of clarity�.

With regard to my proposal that God could have implanted the knowledge of his existence in our minds at birth, you responded that such knowledge would be unduly coercive. And you supported your position with a hypothetical case in which, in some future society, everyone is implanted with a device that leads them to believe that Big Brother is watching. Now, I suspect that this is rushing things a bit. Consider the belief �Big Brother is Watching�. I agree that those who form such a belief would most likely feel the coercive force of an external authority impinging upon their decisions. But the belief that God exists cannot plausibly be thought of as akin to the belief that there is someone looking over your shoulder all day, all night, watching to see whether you make the right choices. Some people, of course, do conceptualize God in this way. But my point is that, once you come to accept the belief that God exists, there is a wide degree of latitude available as to how you think God relates to his creatures and to the world in general. You might think, for example, that God will not punish you (or at least not punish you right away) if you do the wrong thing. And if you take such a view of God, then your awareness of God may not deter you very much from pursuing your evil plans. But even more importantly (and this is a point I was trying to make in a previous posting), you might be quite sure that God exists, but you may falsely believe that, say, exterminating Jews is morally right � in this case, too, your awareness of God will not turn you away from your pursuit of evil. In other words, such phenomena as self-deception, moral ignorance, and weakness of will cannot be overlooked in discussions on divine hiddenness.

By the way, are you writing a paper or dissertation on the topic of divine hiddenness?

Nick,

Trent and I are working on a paper on this topic. We hope to have a draft ready by New Years.

With respect to an evil of clarity, the evil is that a greater degree of moral perversity is manifested when one performs wrong acts while aware of God�s presence. It�s a greater offense to intentionally disobey a person than to just disobey a person.

About your other point I�ll have to think more about it. I wonder how this point fits in the overall dialectic. Schellenberg is interested in belief that God exists as a necessary condition for a personally fulfilling relationship. The �innate move� gets belief that God exists and leeway for character development, but not a personally fulfilling relationship. My initial reaction is that this move (by itself) would still render doubtful that a loving personal God existed. Do you mean the innate belief to be that a loving personal God exists? If so, then it seems odd to me that this would be merely an innate belief. Also, I�m not convinced that this belief would not be coercive. Of course if you change other beliefs about what is right or about whether God cares then I can see how self-deception, etc., will play a role. But then I wonder whether this is really a belief that God is present.

Hi Ted,

I would love to have a look at your paper once it is ready, as I have a great interest in the matter of divine hiddenness.

You wrote:
"With respect to an evil of clarity, the evil is that a greater degree of moral perversity is manifested when one performs wrong acts while aware of God�s presence. It�s a greater offense to intentionally disobey a person than to just disobey a person."

I�m still not convinced that this is right. Consider the following case: Jones zealously affirms the existence of God and he bombs a restaurant in the (mistaken) belief that this is what God has ordered him to do. We may assume that Jones has done something wrong, indeed terribly wrong. We may also safely assume that he has disobeyed God�s wishes or commands. But can we assume that he has *intentionally* disobeyed God? I cannot *intentionally* disobey you unless (a) I believe that you have ordered me to do X, and yet (b) I have not gone on to do X. Condition (a) does not hold in the Jones case.

And so, there is no reason to think that people who are aware of God�s existence and commit some wrong act are necessarily more depraved than those who commit some wrong act without being aware of God�s existence.

With regard to my �innate belief proposal�, I had in mind an innate belief that there exists a perfect being. From that single, simple belief it can easily be deduced that there exists a being who is perfect in goodness, love, power, knowledge, etc. And just to forestall any problems some may experience in making this deduction, God could make it self-evident to us that the one belief [a perfect being exists] entails the other belief [there exists a being who is perfect in love, power, etc.].

I can see why being in a situation of epistemic immediacy with God (i.e., experiencing the presence and glory of God in an intense and continuous manner) would be coercive. But I can�t see why merely assenting to the proposition that there exists a perfect being would be at all coercive. After all, you might say to yourself, �There is a perfect being. So what? I couldn�t care less. I�m more interested in x, y, and z.�

I might make one more point. I have been reading over some of the past comments made here, and I think the real weakness in your argument is your conception of a �personal relationship�. For example, in your October 8 and 10 posts you provide some cases which purport to show that a personal relationship can exist between A and B even though A is only dimly aware or even totally unaware of the existence of B. I think this is a misuse of the phrase *personal relationship*, at least as this phrase is ordinarily understood. If I put out some milk and rice to feed a stray cat, and unbeknownst to me the food is taken by a homeless person, you could say that there is some sort of relationship between that homeless person and myself. But it�s not a *personal* relationship. A personal relationship requires reciprocal feelings of some sort, where this involves one person having certain feelings (e.g., feelings of affection, of disdain, of hatred, etc) towards another person, and vice versa � and, clearly, such feelings cannot be had unless each person is aware of the existence of the other person.

So, I can�t see how someone could have a personal relationship (let alone a significant personal relationship) with God without at least being consciously aware of God�s existence.