Suppose we agree with the following: in every case of moral responsibility, there is a flicker of freedom, construed as involving a counterpossibility of some sort (there's been discussion of this here already, so I won't repeat), but also that the flicker in question isn't sufficient to undergird attributions of responsibility. This, I think, is John Fischer's semi-compatibilist position.
Suppose also that only necessary universalism, as opposed to contingent universalism, has a chance of solving the problem of hell. On this view, it is metaphysically necessary that everyone end up in heaven.
The primary argument against necessary universalism appeals to the value of freedom and the impossibility of guaranteeing that a free individual chooses in whatever way choice is related to presence in heaven. This argument has to be replaced, I think, if the above account is correct. I think freedom has been valued to the extent it has because it is thought that freedom is necessary and sufficient for responsibility. With this assumption, the freedom argument makes it your own fault if you're not in heaven.
On the above account, freedom may be necessary for responsibility but it is not sufficient. So even if there is a flicker of freedom, that is no guarantee that it's your own fault if you're in hell.
That still leaves it possible for a person to be in hell and it to be their own fault. But the kind of possibility here is weaker than metaphysical possibility. It is the kind in which the truth of what is said before doesn't logically imply the opposite of the claim in question. That is, the kind of possibility here is logical possibility. There is no argument, however, from such a logical possibility to metaphysical possibility. Hence, it looks like the freedom argument against necessary universalism succumbs if the Fischer view is correct.
Sound right?
Interesting, Jonathan!
By the way, since I'm a compatibilist about the relationship between causal determinism and moral responsibility, I believe there can be cases of moral responsibility without even a flicker of freedom (in the sense of alternative possibilities-freedom). I think alternative-possibilities freedom just is not the place to look in seeking to ground ascriptions of responsibility.
There is a very interesting article by Andrew Eshleman some years back in Religious Studies (I believe) in which he argues that the Frankfurt-type examples show that such freedom (alternative-possibilities freedom) is over-rated as regards the Problem of Evil.
Cheers!
If you're interested, I have some related musings about universalism (and certain universalism), freedom & divine foreknowledge on-line. It's in an Appendix I put up last summer to "Universalism and the Bible" & it's at:
http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/univ.htm#B
Jonathan,
I'm not sure I get it. The non-compatibilist free will advocate says "Freedom requires at least a flicker of other possibilities." Now those who claim that people might freely choose hell might attempt to take refuge in the idea that genuine freedom requires a flicker, and so there might be some who freely choose hell (and have the flicker of freedom in their choice) but who are nevertheless not morally responsible for their choice since the flicker, though perhaps necessary for freedom, is not sufficient for responsibility. Is that right?
While the flicker of freedom might not be sufficient for responsibility on its own, still the flicker together with the conditions that the compatibiliist sets forth might seem to be (and might seem to be uncontroversially so). After all, such conditions would seem to have the stamp of the both the incompatibilist and the compatibilist. Anyway, suppose that one chooses hell but does so in a way that allows for the flicker (that is, at some point in the decision-making processes, an inclination that might have lead to an alternative decision existed and which, left to its own accord, might have led to an alternative path, but suppose also that of the person's own volition or intention, she continues as she has been). I don't see why we can't add to at least some of these cases whatever extra conditions the compatibilist would need to make the case one of responsibility. So person P begins to have the inclination to given in to divine grace (and hence has the flicker) but also has a strong stubborn streak that allows her to override her initial inclination. Don't we then get both the flicker and the other conditions of responsibility satisfied even among those who resist grace?
Having said that, let me say that I think all of this might need to be temporally indexed in such a way that still makes room for necessary universalism. The idea is that even if at t, it is true that a person can have the flicker and satisfy the other conditions of responsibility, and hence be responsible for failing to be reconciled with God at t, this is not itself sufficient to show that necessary univeralism is false. For the latter thesis (as I understand it) says that for each world containing (human) persons, there is some value of time-reference t such that (i) at t, every person is then reconciled to God and (ii) there is no time subsequent to t when there are any persons (human) persons who are not then reconciled to God.
Undoubtedly misunderstanding something,
Tom Senor
Keith--yes I've seen your paper, and liked it. I especially liked the story where you quote St. Paul and get accused of making up unbiblical claims!
Tom--no, you're not missing anything. The point of my post is simply the question of whether from a premise about the nature of freedom one can rule out necessary universalism. I leave open whether a full account of responsibility would rule it out (though I doubt it--I think the best argument against necessary universalism has to undermine it by appeal to the importance and nature of freedom). If I'm now right, that means the argument I gave in my hell book against necessary universalism doesn't work...
Keith--one more point. I think that certain universalism may not have the resources to solve the problem of hell. Any version of contingent universalism will leave worlds where some end up in hell, so there is a modal problem of evil here unless sending someone to hell is morally unproblematic.
But I may be misremembering your view, but I thought certain universalism doesn't imply necessary universalism...
Certain universalism, so far as I can see, can go either way on the necessary/contingent question. All it requires is that if there are worlds in which some never make it to the party, it is certain that none of those worlds will be actual.
Keith, this is interesting. Suppose there are worlds that can't be actualized, but in which there are gratuitous evils, ones that a good God simply could not allow. It follows then that God's goodness is only contingent.
OK, so much for the obvious. Do you think that the fact that such worlds can't be actualized somehow makes the problem of hell or the problem of evil less problematic in some way? Suppose certain universalism simply said, "yes, there are worlds in which some end up in hell forever, but there is no chance that such a world is actual." That would leave such worlds actualizable, but with no chance of being actual; would there be a more difficult problem for the universalist on this reading?
The reason I ask is that I don't see in your discussion an account of qualifier "certain," and on my understanding of the term, I can get to the conclusion about there being no chance of anyone ending up in hell (I want to interdefine chance and certainty here).
My post was meant to reflect my latest thinking about universalism, resulting from my more pessimistic attitudes of late about what it takes to get out of Frankfurt-style counterexamples. I now doubt that there is an argument from freedom against necessary universalism, and that's nice for universalism since merely contingent versions only modally mask the problem of hell.
I'd be interested to hear if you think either of the stronger, but not necessary, versions of universalism somehow do better than simple contingent universalism against the claim that non-necessary versions only modally mask the problem of hell (the two stronger versions are either that there is no chance of such a world being actual or that such worlds are unactualizable).
Jon,
Here's what I'm still not clear on (I confess that while I gave your hell book a quick read when it first appeared, I don't at the moment refer much about your argument): you give an argument against necessary universalism a premise of which (I take it) is that a certain kind of libertarianism is possibly true. I guess there is this other premise to the effect that if the libertarian premise is right, them some people might be responsible for their own damnation.
But now you've come to doubt what I'm referring to as "this other premise." It seems that the flicker isn't sufficient for responsibility, and so even if libertarian freedom is possible, it doesn't follow that, possibily, some people are responsible for their own damnation. Is this (or something equivalent) the basic idea?
My question is why not pack all the responsibility stuff into the first premise? That is why not place your bets on this claim: possibly, there are people who freely decide not to be reconciled to God, where "freely decide" means something like "make flickered choices in which the other conditions of responsibility are met"?
Does it seem to you that the first libertarian proposition (the one with flicker but w/o responsbility) is defensible whereas the second, somewhat more full-blooded version is not?
Or maybe I just need to re-read your book.
Tom
Regarding my first parenthetical remark above: Oops.....actually, I do "refer" much to your argument; it's the "remembering" that gives me trouble.
(Note to self: never write philosophy that will be posted publically while you are watching a movie on cable.)
Tom--yes, I think you recall the basics of the argument just fine. And it is the next premise, tying freedom together with responsibility that I now doubt is true. But packing this claim into the first premise will just give me reasons to doubt the first premise instead, because I think the extent to which freedom is connected to responsibility in our world is a necessary feature of responsibility.
I just put a post on the garden of forking paths blog about whether there could be instantaneous actions. If there could be such, and if these actions explained presence in hell, then there is still some hope for my freedom argument. But I'm not sure there can be instantaneous actions, so I'm still thinking about it...
Hope the movie was good!
Keith, in my earlier note about certain universalism, I left of half of what I meant to say in the first paragraph. I meant to say that from the concept of certainty here, I can see how you can get from it to there being no chance of a hell-world being actualized, but not how to get to the claim that a hell-world is unactualizable. That's because I think things can happen that have no chance of happening...
"Can" is extremely slippery!
How I would answer your questions, Jon, depends on some very particular views I hold (vaguely Descartes-like views!) on the relations between God's power, God's will, and metaphysical modality, and so shouldn't be taken to reflect on universalism generally.
But for what it's worth...
Avoiding "can" & sticking instead to constructions like "within God's power to..." and "metaphysically possible that...",
I think there are worlds containing everlasting damnations that are within God's power to actualize, but I think it is certain that, indeed [here's where it gets strange by the sensibilities of many] it is metaphysically necessary that, God will not exercise the power to actualize any such world.
These for me are metaphsically impossible worlds, though they are within God's power to actualize. In the case of God, "A has the power to bring about S" does not imply that S is a metaphsically possible situation. The met. impossibility of these situations survives the existence of an agent with the power to make them actual because the agent in question (God) has a will very different from other agents; the impossibility is grounded in God's will, not His (lack of) power.
["God has a power He cannot exercise?!! What kind of power is that?!!"
There's that pesky "can" again. God has the power to exercise His power to actualize the worlds in question, but it is metaphysically impossible that He will exercise His power to actualize the worlds in question, and it is metaphsically impossible that He will exercise the second-order power we've just introduced, though He retains the power to exercise that second-order power. Etc. (as needed)]
Keith, here's what I take from your comments. You hold that God's damnation is impossible, but you don't hold it on the basis of some inference from certainty to necessity. And, you hold that such damnation worlds are metaphysically impossible. So, you affirm (metaphysically)necessary universalism, but in the end you're not trying to derive this necessity claim from your certainty claim--right?
The strange part is that you want to endorse the view that God has the power to actualize (some? all?) metaphysically impossible worlds. That will make easy work of the paradox of the stone! But why do you think this? Do you take it to be derivable from "most perfect being" considerations?