Announcing the Prosblogion Virtual Colloquium
October 2, 2016 — 15:29

Author: Kenny Pearce  Category: Housekeeping  Tags: , , , ,   Comments: 4

In the coming weeks, I will begin running a new feature on this blog which I am calling ‘the Prosblogion Virtual Colloquium’. Like a real philosophy department colloquium, the virtual colloquium aims to be a weekly discussion of a philosophy paper. This being the Prosblogion, these will of course be papers in philosophy of religion. However, this term will be construed in a very broad sense to include philosophy papers in any field and any tradition that are relevant to religion in general or to any particular religion. I will be trying, as much as possible, to span the full diversity of philosophers, philosophical projects, arguments and positions that fall within that very general characterization of philosophy of religion. The colloquium will primarily feature the work of junior scholars.

I have several aims for this project. First, I hope simply that this will foster interesting discussion of philosophical issues related to religion(s). Second, I think it is an unfortunate feature of the academic discipline of philosophy that many excellent papers are barely read and commented on at all. I therefore hope that the virtual colloquium will help a variety of philosophy papers to be part of a genuine conversation (and maybe not wait years to be cited for the first time!). Third, I hope that the series will help to bring attention to the diverse kinds of work being undertaken in contemporary philosophy of religion and the variety of positions and arguments being defended. Finally, I hope that this will provide an opportunity for philosophers who don’t get to attend conferences and colloquia on a regular basis to engage in helpful back-and-forth philosophical discussion at a high level.

I am open to suggestions about format, but my current plan is as follows. Just like an in-person colloquium, I will briefly introduce the colloquium ‘speaker’. Following this, the ‘speaker’ will give an introductory summary of the paper under discussion (recommended length about 800 words, but flexible). Then there will be a link to the full text of the paper. The paper may be a draft or a recent publication, but must be online somewhere. Open access is of course preferable, but where this is infeasible for copyright reasons a link to the journal (or PhilPapers) to allow those who have access through their university would be acceptable.

If there is sufficient interest, I hope to run the first virtual colloquium on Friday, October 14 and hold subsequent colloquia each Friday through at least the end of the present academic year. I am beginning to contact potential presenters right away. I would appreciate receiving nominations particularly of junior philosophers who have a draft or recent publication in philosophy of religion to discuss. These can be left in the comments below, or sent by email to Receiving plenty of nominations from lots of different people will help to ensure the schedule does not end up unduly biased toward my own philosophical propensities. Self-nominations are also encouraged!

  • This is a self nomination. An essay that because a book: By Lance Kair, i think is a valuable contribution to the philosophy of religion with reference to contemoprary issues; specifically Laruelle’s nonphilosophy, Harmans OOO/OOP the SRs, and Ambigen.

    October 2, 2016 — 19:49
  • PeterJ

    Hi Kenny. I’d be up for submitting a paper for discussion sometime if you’re not already overwhelmed.

    October 4, 2016 — 4:30
  • Eric Rasmusen

    When I read this, I thought it wouldn’t apply to me, since I’m quite senior, but then I realized that in philosophy, as opposed to economics, I’m very junior, in the typical state of a young scholar who maybe has some good ideas but is naive about how to execute them and how they fit into the literature. Thus, perhaps these two working papers would be appropriate— and I certainly invite comment:

    “The Concealment Argument: Why No Conclusive Evidence or Proof for God’s Existence Will Be Found.” Logic and Biblical evidence suggest that God wishes that some but not all humans become convinced of His existence and desires. If so, this suggests that attempts to either prove or disprove such things as God’s existence, past miracles, or present supernatural intervention are doomed to failure, because God could and would take care to evade any such efforts. (

    “Fine Tuning, Hume’s Miracle Test, and Intelligent Design” with Eric Hedin. “Fine tuning” refers to the well-known puzzle that the values of certain physical parameters need to take certain precise values for life to exist, values tuned to within 1 in 1050. Some therefore suggest that an intelligent designer must have created the universe. A “miracle” is an event highly improbable according to our prior beliefs. Hume’s miracle test says that if someone tells us a miracle has occurred, we should balance the probability it truly did occur against the probability he is lying. Fine-tuning is conceptually the same as a miracle. Physicists propose a theory consistent with the data, but it is consistent only if one or more parameters takes an extremely low-probability value. Hume’s miracle test tells us we must compare this with the probability the scientists are lying or deceived. That is highly improbable, but as improbable as the “miracle”? If not, our choice is not between intelligent design and random coincidence, but between intelligent design and current scientific theory. Without the feature of a designer, the supposed fit to data of several standard scientific theories is less probable than that the leaders in those subfields are lying or deceived. Intelligent design makes a falsifiable prediction: that current physics theory will continue to make correct predictions of reality, of which fine-tuning will be a part. The alternative, scientist fraud or error, implies that in time current scientific theory will prove to be false and the coincidences will disappear. Thus, intelligent design is the savior of physics, not its rival.

    October 5, 2016 — 9:11
  • Andrew

    Ricki Bliss, Metaphysical Foundationalism and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, at

    The metaphysical foundationalist claims that reality is hierarchically arranged, with maximal chains of phenomena ordered by the grounding relation terminating in contingently existent fundamentalia. Some influential foundationalists claim that there must be something fundamental because being requires a ground or explanation, or because grounding chains that do not terminate are viciously infinitely regressive. Surprisingly, reconstruction of these arguments reveals an enthymematic assumption that makes appeal to a Principle of Sufficient Reason: a principle the foundationalist would not, and should not, accept. I explore three different Principles of Sufficient Reason: two familiar to us from cosmological arguments and one, novel, dependence PSR. I argue that without a PSR, certain of the most influential arguments to the existence of something fundamental do not work; and that with a PSR, certain of the most influential arguments to the existence of something fundamental leave us with a position that is epistemically unstable.

    October 12, 2016 — 11:31
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