I listed five false consequences of the standard view of personhood. Let me offer the continuant argument that I’m not a person. I mean, of course, that I am not essentially a person in the standard sense of personhood. I’d like to know where the argument goes wrong. I can’t see any place where it does. It’s actually a simple argument.
1. Standard view of personhood. Assumption
2. S and S’ are indiscernible continuants in indiscernible worlds. Assume
3. S and S’ lose the properties of rationality and consciousness at t. Assume
4. S and S’ are in indiscernible psychological states at t – t’. Assume
5. S never regains rationality or consciousness. Assume
6. S’ regains rationality and consciousness at t’. Assume
7. S ceases to exist at t. From 1,2,5
8. S’ ceases to exist at t. From 1,4,7
9. S’ does not cease to exist at t and has the full profile of moral rights at t. Fact, Contradiction (8, 9)
10. ∴ Standard view of personhood is false. 1,9
11. ∴ S does not cease to exist at t and has the full profile of moral rights at t. 4,9, 10
The only candidate for rejection in the argument is (1). S and S’ are therefore not persons in the standard sense. S and S’ exist without rationality or awareness at t, and have the full profile of moral rights at t.