As I have argued elsewhere, it is very difficult to reconcile the idea that God intentionally designed human beings with the statistical explanations we would expect to see in a completed evolutionary theory. One might respond that our current evolutionary theory is not thus completed, but it would be nice to have a story that would fit even with a future completed theory. I now offer such a solution, albeit one I am not fond of.
Suppose first that God determines (either directly or mediately) every quantum event in the evolutionary history of human beings. Suppose further that physical reality is infinite, either spatially or temporally or in the multiverse way, in such wise that the quantum events in our evolutionary history can be arranged into a fairly natural infinite sequence and given frequentist probabilities
So far this is a simple and quite unoriginal solution. And it is insufficient. A standard problem with frequentist accounts is that they get the order of explanations wrong. It is central to a completed evolutionary story that the probabilistic facts explain the arising of human beings. But if the probabilistic facts are grounded in the sequence of events, as on frequentism they are, then they cannot explain what happens in that sequence of events. Some Humeans are happy to bite the bullet and accept circular explanations here, but I take the objection to be very serious.
However, theistic frequentism has a resource that bare frequentism does not. The theistic frequentist can make probability facts be grounded not in the frequencies of the infinite sequence of events as such, but in God’s intention to produce an infinite sequence of events with such-and-such frequencies and to do so under the description “an infinite sequence of events with such-and-such frequencies.” This requires God to have a reason to produce a sequence of events with such-and-such frequencies as such, but a reason is not hard to find–statistical order is a genuine kind of order and order is valuable.
The theistic frequentist now has much less of a circularity worry. It is not the infinite sequence of events that grounds the probabilities that are, in turn, supposed to explain the events within the evolutionary sequence. Rather, it is God’s intention to produce events with such-and-such frequencies that grounds the probabilities, and the events in the sequence can be non-circularly explained by their having frequencies that God had good reason (say, based on order) to produce.
The resulting statistical explanation of the arising of human beings is incomplete. For God chose the frequencies he did as well as the particular events with the frequencies partly in order to produce human beings. Presumably, the full story about God’s intentions will involve an interplay between considerations about the sorts of beings to produce and considerations about the kinds and frequencies of events by which to produce them. But even though the statistical explanation is incomplete, it is still an explanation. And it should be no part of even a completed evolutionary theory to claim that it provides the whole correct explanatory story, but only that it provides a correct explanatory story.
The general point is that the theist can adopt some Humean-style “explanations” (such as frequentist ones) in such a way that the theistic underpinnings compensate for the explanatory poverty of Humean stories (cf. this).
Final technical remarks on frequentism: As a first approximation, we might use standard infinite-sequence frequentism: chances just are frequencies of events in infinite sequences. But there are technical problems with this, most notably that as De Finetti has noted this in general doesn’t actually satisfy the axioms of probability (see here for loads of criticisms). Fortunately, the main technical problems can be overcome by replacing the standard definition of chances in terms of frequencies with a more complex one. There are also philosophical problems. Let me overcome some of these by saying that I am making no claim that chances or probabilities are the same thing as frequencies. Rather, I adopt a pluralism: anything that satisfies the axioms of probability is a probability. Infinite-sequence frequentist “probabilities”, when defined in the tweaked way satisfy the axioms of probability, and hence really are probabilities. In this way, I escape the standard objection to frequentism that surely single-case chances are possible. For I make no claim that all chances or probabilities are of the frequentist variety.
Final note: I really don’t like the frequentist theory I give in this post.