I remember encountering as an undergrad the notion (Mackie?) that moral properties were “queer.” Then I remember reading some stuff in Phil Mind about “ectoplasm” and “spook stuff” with attributions of mental substance as “spooky.” I don’t know where this nonsense got started, but I was surprised “real” philosophers would play this kind of card. It is nothing less than a cop out. I once asked a famous atheist why he didn’t believe in God, and he said because it was just “weird” and compared it to belief in numbers. Not acceptable. We’re stuck with the weird. Peter van Inwagen is eloquent on this: that we face a choice among mysteries, not a choice between mystery and something else (actually I said that, but he inspired me to say it).
I’m not a Platonist. I find most Platonism inexplicable and at times unintelligible. But I don’t object to abstracta because they are “weird.” I don’t believe in concrete modal realism. But that’s because I find it raises more questions than it answers. It’s explanatory power and it’s ability to give a reductive account of modality provide reasons to believe it, but those reasons are outweighed in my estimation by reasons not to believe it (for example, I think it is very non-parsimonious). I don’t believe in the possibility of gunk or extended simples. But this is not because they are weird, though I do find extended simples weird. The point is this: If anyone should be able to get past the weird, it is philosophers. The weird awaits us around every corner. There are weird things about endurantism and certainly weird things about perdurantism, but I believe perdurantism because of its explanatory power and its vindication of certain deep intuitions I have about time and symmetry.
It is just laziness or a failure of nerve or both to dismiss God as “weird” or mental causation as “spooky.” We ought to do as we do with all metaphysics: follow the argument. Just as importantly, the assessment of the prior probability of theism should be set in a principled way, not by how unfamiliar the concept of God might be. Omnipotence, for example, is not a complex property. Potency is the ability to actualize states of affairs. “Omni-” means “all.” So the range of states of affairs actualizable by omnipotence is…all of them (in logically consistent aggregates). Plausibly, all God’s properties follow form omnipotence, for here’s a possible state of affairs “My knowing whether p.” At any rate, bare theism is built up out of very simple properties and parameters. Mental properties and substances are postulated for essentially the same reasons *substances* are postulated. Only a crude scientism can justify dismissal mental properties and substances out of hand.
The appeal to “spookiness” and “weirdness” represents a failure of nerve and should be discouraged.