Nelson Pike Conference
August 13, 2010 — 19:10

Author: Garret Pendergraft  Category: Divine Foreknowledge Free Will News  Comments: 2

Some of you may have seen the announcement on Philosophy Updates, but in case you haven’t (or as a reminder):
On December 11th, 2010, the University of California, Riverside and the University of California, Irvine will co-sponsor a conference in honor of Nelson Pike. It will be held at UCI, and the speakers will be:

  • Robert Adams,
  • Marilyn Adams,
  • David Woodruff Smith, and
  • John Fischer.

It should be good times, so please save the date! Stay tuned for more details as they develop, or feel free to contact John Fischer.
And, as an added bonus, only for Prosblogion readers,* to get you pumped for the conference, check out this re-reading of Pike’s argument from the aforementioned John Fischer (along with his co-authors Patrick Todd and Neal Tognazzini).
* Not really—but it is difficult to find online.

Comments:
  • Dustin Crummett

    In sum, we think the sort of cross-time explanations invoked by Ockhamists are incompatible with presentism. Since, on presentism, future free decisions do not exist, they cannot explain why certain facts are facts in the past. Specifically, they cannot explain why God holds certain beliefs; the fact that at t1 God has a certain belief about what a future agent will do at t10 cannot be explained by the agent’s decision at t10…
    However, even if eternalism can overcome whatever problems it faces, and even if there are no special problems arising from the conjunction of eternalism and theism, we would still like to point out that at least one prominent Ockhamist—Plantinga—does wish to be a presentist.
    Would the conjunction of presentism and Ockhamism still be a problem if, like Plantinga, you are a Molinist? If there are true facts about what you would freely do in situations that never exist, why wouldn’t there be ones about situations that don’t exist yet?

    August 24, 2010 — 22:37
  • (*) “Since, on presentism, future free decisions do not exist, they cannot explain why certain facts are facts in the past.”
    I don’t see how this is any more compelling than:
    (**) “Since, on presentism, past events do not exist, they cannot explain why certain facts are facts in the future.”
    But (**) is just the old problem of cross-time causal relations, which every presentist had better think is soluble. So whatever the presentist says about (**), she should just say that about (*).
    Granted, in (*), on the Ockhamist view, we have a constitutive explanation while in (*)) we may have a causal explanation. But I am not sure that makes a difference.

    August 25, 2010 — 9:11