It’s puzzling how transworld sanctified agents are supposed to pose a problem for Plantinga’s free will defense. I’m happy to grant Hawthorne and Howard-Snyder’s (P).
P. It is possible that, necessarily, some creaturely essence (or other) is transworld sanctified.
So, for all we know, in every possible world some creaturely essence is transworld sanctified. We can conclude immediately that (P1) is also true.
P1. It is possible that, necessarily, not every creaturely essence is transworld depraved.
Perfectly fine with me. Now, what is the problem for Plantinga’s free will defense? Is it supposed to be this conclusion?
C. For all we know, it is necessary that some feasible worlds do not include any moral agents that go wrong with respect to any morally significant choice.
The problem posed by transworld sanctified agents cannot be (C). Plantinga agrees that (C) is true. After all, Plantinga concedes (C1),
C1. It is necessary that some feasible world includes no instantiated moral agents at all.
And (C1) entails (C). So maybe the problem is supposed to be (C2).
C2. For all we know, it is necessary that some feasible worlds include only those moral agents that always go right.
But (C2) is cannot be the problem posed by transworld sanctified agents either. Here’s why. The free will defense urges that (C3) is true.
C3. It is better to actualize W, in which some free agents go wrong, than to actualize a world W1, in which there are no free agents at all.
Let the moral evil in W = E. Let the value of having agents exercising their freedom in W = F. Since W is more valuable than W1 we know that, necessarily, (E & F) has a net positive value. Now suppose (C2) is true and W2 is a world in which the only free agents are a transworld sanctified agent or two. These agents, of course, never go wrong.
There is another world W3 that includes some transworld depraved agents and is such that W3 is better than W2. Just let W3 = [W2 + (E & F)]. Since (E & F) is positive, we know that W3 = [W2 + (E & F)] is better than W2.
If (1) God should actualize a world with some transworld depraved agents rather than a world with no free agents at all, then (2) God should actualize a world with some transworld depraved agents in addtion to the transworld sanctified agents rather than a world with only transworld sanctified agents. Since the FWD shows (1) is true, it shows that (2) is true.
The possible necessity of transworld sanctified agents presents no problem at all for FWD.