In a series of recent posts Dale Tuggy has been going after some issues for social trinitarians. (See here, here, here, and now here.) In his most recent post Tuggy offers an argument the conclusion of which I’m attracted to. To wit, that “no Anselmian social trinitarian argument is sound.” Here is the argument:
- Greatness either supervenes only on intrinsic, essential properties, or not.
- If it does, then the property “loving another” isn’t a great-making property (it isn’t intrinsic).
- If the property of “loving another” isn’t a great-making property, then no Anselmian social trinitarian argument is sound.
- If it does not, then properties other than intrinsic and essential ones may contribute to a thing’s greatness.
- If properties other than intrinsic and essential ones may
contribute to a thing’s greatness, then some of these other properties
are infinitely increasable.
- If some of these properties are infinitely increasable,
then the concept of a Greatest Possible Being (GPB) is in fact the
concept of an impossible being (in other words, there couldn’t be a
- If a GPB is an impossible being, then this reasoning is always unsound:
- God is a GPB.
- For any x, if x is a GPB, then x has feature F.
- God has feature F.
- If the above reasoning is unsound, then no Anselmian social trinitarian argument is sound.
- Either way, no Anselmian social trinitarian argument is sound.
I think Tuggy’s on sold ground with regards to the GPB, and I suspect those sympathetic to the social trinity will object to #2. In any case, you should leave your comments over at Trinities.