The following propositions are incompatible:
- Metaphysically necessarily, there are no facts of the matter about future free actions.
- Metaphysically necessarily, one is better off insofar as one's morally good plans are fulfilled and worse off insofar as one's morally good plans are not fulfilled.
- Metaphysically possibly, there was a person x who permanently ceased to exist and who made a morally good plan whose fulfillment required a free action after x's permanent death.
- Metaphysically necessarily, one is neither well nor badly off when one does not exist.
I conclude that (1) is false, but others might draw other conclusions.
There is a difficulty about the permanent cessation of existence. As Jon Kvanvig has pointed out, if there is an open future, there are some difficulties in making sense of any logically contingent facts about the future, even ones that are predictable by means of the laws of nature. However, if an at all orthodox open theism (not that I think an open theism can be very orthodox) is true, then God has to be able to guarantee claims about the respective eternal destinations of the just and the unjust. If God can do that in some way (say, by making binding promises), he should be able to guarantee that x permanently ceases to exist. Alternately, if one thinks that temporally gappy existence of persons is logically impossible, one can replace "permanently ceased to" with "ceased to exist". There will also be theological difficulties for those who think that annihilation, which is after all worse than eternal damnation, is incompatible with divine goodness. Open theists convinced of these difficulties will be able to shrug off my argument.