The Prosblogion

Just got my advance copies of Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion I. The Oxford link is here, which has the table of contents for your perusal.

Word has it that quality of critical essays on material in the book goes up when you own your own copy!

So there's the theistic explanation for the fine-tuning of the universe and the many-universes atheistic explanation. One of the criticisms that theists have made of the many-universes atheistic explanation is that there is no independent evidence that such universes exist. I was wondering if anybody's put forth the idea that all of David Lewis' reasons for believing in concrete possible worlds are reasons to believe in many universes. With Lewis' possibilism in place, we have a response to this criticism. (I'm sure that's not the only response; anyway, this is the response I'm interested in.) Does anybody know if anyone has written on the connection between Lewis' possible worlds and the many-universes hypothesis?

It's often considered arrogant and false to say that one way of living is superior to another. As a Korean American, there are certain ways that I live life (in relating to family, work, food, etc.) that are different from the ways most other Americans live life; but I wouldn't say they are superior - that would be false and arrogant.

But there are certain ways of living that many would agree are superior to other ways: living in community with other people that we love and are loved by is a better way of living than living in denial of the existence and worth of other people. This seems quite plausible to me.

Let's take this another step. It seems to me that in the same way, Christians are committed to believing that their way of life is superior to that of atheists. As Christians, we (I speak as a Christian) believe that we have a committed relationship with God, the most valuable and worthy being possible. We believe that God loves us, and he loves us so much that he would send his Son to endure a horrible death so that we could be reconciled to him. We believe that God the Holy Spirit lives inside of us and is with us. We believe that we can converse with God, through praying to him and through hearing from him (minimally, from the Bible). There is a 'way of living' that incorporates these specifically Christian beliefs into one's life, and I will call that 'the Christian way of living'. (I admit that this is a little vague; maybe I'll have the chance to clear it up in the discussion; I think that there is something to the notion.) Atheists deny that God exists and that God does any of these things with or for humans. So atheists do not live the Christian way of living.

It seems to me that in the same way that it is plausible to think that a person who denies the existence and value of other people is living a way of life that is inferior, so should the Christian think that the atheist is living an inferior way of life by not living the Christian way of life. And I think that this is an interesting and surprising conclusion, though some may find it completely obvious. I'm still trying to get clear on my thoughts on the matter, so comments are welcome.

Warning! Shameless plug to follow...

In the last few years I've looked at numerous syllabi used in philosophy of religion courses. Besides the usual caveats, grading scales, and policies, these syllabi often make nods towards the objective of thinking philosophically about religion. However, 'religion' is, in almost all cases, largely restricted to western theism. One of the challenges of breaking out of this mold is that most introductory textbooks and readers are geared towards philosophy of religion in the western context. Up until now it has been difficult to know where to start if you wanted to include more non-Western sources. Enter Andrew Eshleman's edit volume Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: East Meets West from Blackwell. The volume has a nice selection of readings from names that we've all come to know like Swinburne, Plantinga, Mackie, Alston, Rowe, Hick, Craig, Paley, and more. Interspersed throughout each section though are selections from Hindu, Daoist, Confucian, and Buddhist, thinkers. Frankly this is a book that has probably been long overdue.

Full disclosure: Eshleman was one of my professors as an undergrad and I read drafts of the introductory material for the book. However, I'd have plugged the book in any case because such a volume deserves to be brought to broader attention.

The latest installment in Salon's Atoms and Eden series on science and religion is an interview with Ken Wilber. Steve Paulson says that Wilber "may be the most important living philosopher you've never heard of." I admit up front that my familiarity with Wilber's work is limited (I've never read any of his books), but of all the people I've known who considered Wilber to be worthwhile, only one was someone whom I respected intellectually. Now that I've laid out my biases, maybe somebody who is into Wilber can tell me whether I'm mistaken to be so dismissive towards him. I would similarly encourage anyone who wishes to confirm me in my suspicions.

The by-line to this article in the New York Magazine: "The fastest-growing faith in America is no faith at all. And now some atheists think they need a church."

Given the topic, I found the headline to be a bit ironic simply because one of the groups Nietzsche is critiquing in his parable of the madman is those atheists who believe that the Enlightenment project and the sciences can continue just as they were without the theistic metaphysics that underlay them.

Otherwise, it's an interesting article that covers some of the history of atheistic "religious" organisations and thoughts by luminaries in the contemporary movement on how to make it mainstream and compensate for the lack of community among atheists that one often finds within the life of an organized faith.

Here's a news story for those of you who do not particularly like The Beatles and think you will not particularly like Expelled. (In other words, it is a post for me, everyone else in humanity that died before The Beatles, and no one else?)

If you're too lazy to click:

John Lennon's sons and widow, Yoko Ono, are suing the filmmakers of "Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed" for using the song "Imagine" in the documentary without permission.

HT to PZ.

I just received a notice from Blackwell about the new book in the Great Debates series featuring a debate between Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley on Knowledge of God. I noticed that one chapter by Plantinga is called "Can Robots Think? A Reply to Tooley's Second Statement."

I have two questions: (1) Can someone tell me what Plantinga's position on artificial thinking is? (2) Can someone give me any good reason why robots will not be able to think in the future?

Theists in general are quite hostile to the possibility of genuine artificial intelligence, but I have yet to hear a good reason why. Suppose that substance dualism is true. This means that you and I do our thinking with a non-physical mind/soul. The fact that we do our thinking with a non-physical mind/soul doesn't show that thinking can only be done with a mind/soul. Compare: The fact that birds do their flying with feathered wings does not mean that feathered wings are required for flying. Helicopters, plants, rockets, etc. fly without feathered wings. So, I can't see why the truth of dualism would preclude AI. And I'm not sure what other good reasons there are.

James

I'm going to teach a course on Science and Religion in the fall for the first time. The course presupposes no (or very little) prior background in philosophy. I was amazed at the number of interesting books that resulted from a search on Amazon using the keywords 'science' and 'religion.' It's hard to know where to begin to sort them out. If some of you could recommend texts on science and religion that you think are excellent, I would appreciate it.
Thanks,
James Beebe

I'm happy to announce the 5th Biennial University of Rochester Graduate Epistemology Conference.

It will be held Friday-Saturday, October 10th-11th on the beautiful campus of the University of Rochester, hosted by the Philosophy Department.

The main speaker is Alvin Goldman and Richard Feldman will be commenting.

The call for paper is here.

Many people have difficulty with God's acts in the Bible because God seems to be committing or commanding immoral acts (e.g., when God commands the Israelites to wipe out certain people-groups, including children). I think that many of these charges can be alleviated if some good justification can be given for the claim that it is morally permissible for God to kill people as he does in the Bible.

One step towards arguing for the claim that it is morally permissible for God to kill people is to argue that people do not have the right not to be killed by God. I may have the right that you not kill me, and vice versa, but

The following three steps are fairly standard (I've seen the third step in a talk this year by Wes Morriston--does anybody have an earlier source?).

Step 1: Consider the conditional:

1. Even if God had commanded it, you shouldn't torture the innocent.

From (1), we can argue that in the possible world where God commands torture of the innocent, it is still wrong, and hence it is not the case that right and wrong are defined by what God commands. (Minor issue: The antecedent of the conditional really perhaps say "if God commanded it and did not forbid it".)

Step 2: Because of God's nature, God cannot command torture of the innocent.

Step 3: Let's grant this. Still:

2. Claim (1) is a non-trivially true per impossibile counterfactual.
3. From (1) and (2) it follows that right and wrong are not defined by God's commands.

Now here is where I want to add a new step to the dialectics:

Step 4: One should deny the conjunction of (2) and (3). The first approach is this. Consider the statement:

4. Even if it were right, you still shouldn't torture the innocent.

I think that the intuitions that pull us to affirm (2) equally pull us to affirm (4). But (4) is, on reflection, absurd. And in any case, (4) should not make us deny that what is right is right! But maybe you're not convinced. Maybe you find (4) ridiculous. Fine. Take whatever metaethical theory you think is right. For concreteness, suppose it's Kantianism. Consider:

5. Even if the categorical imperatives required it, you still shouldn't torture the innocent.

I think (5) is as plausible as (1), and analogues to (2) and (3) where (5) replaces (1) are just as plausible as the originals. Hence, if the argument in Step 3 is a good argument against divine command metaethics, it is a good argument against every non-trivial metaethical theory, and if I am right about the plausibility of (4) it might even be a good argument against the trivial metaethical theory (what is right is right). Hence, the argument in Step 3 is not a good argument against divine command metaethics. Whether the problem is with (2) or with (3) is something I do not know.

Final remark: I find myself with some intellectual akrasia here. I still find (1) a plausible argument against divine command metaethics, despite the criticism. This suggests that there is something about (1) that I am not managing to capture here.