Philosophy Compass Free Virtual Issue on Meta-Philosophy of Religion

We are delighted to present this exciting virtual issue of Philosophy Compass articles, dealing with the Meta-Philosophy of Religion. The four articles below have been specially selected by the editor of our Philosophy of Religion section, Yujin Nagasawa, and will be available for free for the next six months, until October 2014. You can read…

Registration now open for Conference on “Faith and Reason: Themes from Swinburne” Sept 25-27, 2014

We are pleased to announce that registration is now open for “Faith and Reason: Themes from Swinburne,” a conference to be held at Purdue University, September 25-27, 2014.  Details about registration, lodging, and the schedule of events can be found online at the conference website (www.conf.purdue.edu/swinburne).  We encourage you to register for your hotel room…

Wettstein’s practice-based attitude to religious faith: Is realist theism no longer the only game in town?

[this is X-posted at NewApps] In philosophy of religion, realist theism is the dominant outlook: belief in God is similar to belief in other real things (or supposedly real things) like quarks or oxygen. There is a rather triumphalist narrative about the resurgence of realist theism since the demise of logical positivism (see for instance,…

Opinionated Philosophy

I’ve been thinking about the metaphilosophical issue of the value of opinionated philosophy and the value of (maybe highly) opinionated philosophers. Maybe philosophers with strong Socratic sympathies expect all good philosophy to end somewhere in aporia, but a good deal of philosophy doesn’t. There is in any case a common criticism of philosophy of religion…

Maitzen on the Explanatory Power of Penguins

In his contribution to The Puzzle of Existence, Stephen Maitzen defends the surprising claim that penguins hold the answer to the deep mysteries of the universe. Well, that’s not exactly what he says. Maitzen’s position is that the only interpretation of ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ on which that sentence expresses a legitimate,…

Can people be genuine epistemic peers?

[this is cross-posted in NewApps] In Louise Antony’s thought-provoking interview, Gary Gutting asked her about the rationality of her atheism if she were confronted with a theist who is an epistemic peer, someone who is equally intelligent, who knows the arguments for and against theism, etc., this was her response: “In the real world, there are…